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The Right to Conscience vs. The Right to 
Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide, Catholic 
Hospitals, and the Rising Threat to 
Institutional Free Exercise in Healthcare 
Abstract 
 
An imminent conflict is developing between religious healthcare institu-
tions opposed to physician-assisted death (PAD) and their healthcare em-
ployees who wish to offer PAD to their patients.  When these interests clash, 
institutional conscience claims must prevail over doctors’ desires and pa-
tients’ demands. 
This article catalogues the incomplete patchwork of conscience protec-
tions guaranteed to American healthcare workers and institutions, as well as 
the swiftly accelerating wave of PAD legalization sweeping the states.  The 
article documents the tactical vocabulary—deployed with nearly identical 
language in every state PAD statute—that conspicuously anticipates con-
science objections from the massive, and staunchly anti-PAD, Catholic 
healthcare system.  Notably, in each state with legalized PAD, if a 
healthcare employee wishes to administer PAD to a patient, statutory loop-
holes render employing hospitals powerless to object on the basis of institu-
tional conscience. 
Finally, the article proposes a solution to this free exercise threat.  In 
Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Supreme Court recognized 
that religious institutions have a First Amendment right to hire and fire em-
ployees who personify their beliefs, free from government interference.  The 
Court has expressly declined to limit the scope of this right, but it has 
strongly indicated that the proper approach requires deference to the reli-
gious institution itself to define which employees personify its beliefs.  Be-
cause healthcare workers personify the central Catholic mission of healing 
the sick, Catholic hospitals must be permitted to employ only healthcare em-
ployees willing to honor the Church’s sincere beliefs about certain medical 
practices, such as PAD, that violate Catholic institutional conscience. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“I swear by Apollo . . . that I will fulfill according to my ability and 
judgment this oath and this covenant. . . .  I will keep [the sick] from 
harm and injustice.  I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if 
asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. . . .  In purity 
and holiness I will guard my life and my art.” 
—From the original text of the Hippocratic Oath1 
The Hippocratic Oath was not a common feature of medical school 
graduation ceremonies until after World War II, when international outrage 
over physician involvement in Nazi war crimes provoked a heightened focus 
on medical ethics.2  Today, while nearly every U.S. medical school requires 
a recitation of some version of the Oath before graduates may obtain their 
degrees, the text of the Oath has evolved considerably in the decades since 
its rise to prominence.3  The appeal to Apollo has been consigned to ancient 
history, along with, usually, the Oath’s unequivocal prohibition against phy-
sician-assisted death (PAD).4  This age-old edict preventing doctors from 
killing their patients has fallen victim to the progressive whims of modern 
culture, a development which perfectly symbolizes the ongoing erosion of 
the medical field’s ethical foundation in recent decades.5  Untethered from 
any consistent ethical position regarding morally contentious procedures like 
PAD, modern healthcare workers who affirm PAD may validly arrive at dif-
fering moral conclusions from their peers who oppose PAD, and—of partic-
ular concern here—from the religious hospitals employing them.6 
 
 1. LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation, in 
ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 3, 6 (O. Temkin & C.L. Temkin 
eds., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1967). 
 2. Howard Markel, “I Swear by Apollo”—On Taking the Hippocratic Oath, 350 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2026, 2026 (2004). 
 3. Dale C. Smith, The Hippocratic Oath and Modern Medicine, 51 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 
484, 484–500 (1996). 
 4. Markel, supra note 2, at 2027.  In 1993, only fourteen percent of Hippocratic Oaths adminis-
tered in U.S. medical schools prohibited PAD.  Id.  For a discussion of the terminology of PAD, see 
infra note 37. 
 5. Markel, supra note 2, at 2027–28.  
 6. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious 
Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 221 (2002) (“In our morally diverse 
world, conscientious persons may come into conflict with each other and with society’s moral val-
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This article argues that conscience claims must always prevail when that 
struggle unfolds,7 from the individual conscience of a single, anti-PAD 
healthcare worker to the institutional conscience of an entire anti-PAD hos-
pital system.8  Part II provides background for the issue by cataloguing the 
ever-evolving patchwork of “conscience protections” guaranteed to Ameri-
can healthcare workers as well as the swiftly accelerating wave of PAD le-
galization sweeping the states.  Part III captures the threat posed by current 
PAD laws, forecasting the perfect storm brewing as a result of the massive, 
and staunchly anti-PAD, Catholic presence in the healthcare market clashing 
with two conspicuous and highly problematic loopholes currently embedded 
in every state statute legalizing PAD.  Part IV argues that Catholic 
healthcare institutions can and should use the “ministerial exception” to ter-
minate healthcare workers who defy their beliefs on PAD.  Finally, Part V 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
ues.  Except for the amoral sociopath, conflicts of conscience are a regular feature of the moral 
life.”). 
 7. As a purely legal matter, the First Amendment protects the free exercise of “religion,” not 
“conscience.”  See infra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.  However, the Supreme Court has 
recognized, in a series of Vietnam War-era “conscientious objector” cases, that the protection of the 
religion clauses extends to “conscience claims” stemming from non-religious philosophical beliefs.  
See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965) (finding conscience protection for belief 
in “goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed”); Welsh 
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340, 343 (1970) (finding conscience protection for opposition to war 
based on “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong” where beliefs are “held 
with the strength of traditional religious convictions”); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority 
of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1200 (2013) (“The logic of [Seeger 
and Welsh] is that any serious accommodation of religious conscience constitutionally must embrace 
analogous claims of non-religious conscience.”). 
 8. See Pellegrino, supra note 6, at 227–28 (“To act against the dictate of conscience is to act 
against natural law—that portion of divine law accessible to human reason. . . .  Often, to act against 
conscience is to violate personal identity so directly as to lead to severe psychosocial and emotional 
sequelae.”).  Because individual consciences are protected under every state PAD law, this article 
will focus on the serious threat to institutional consciences in the healthcare system, arguing that 
they must preserve their religious liberty by invoking their right to institutional free exercise.  See 
infra Part IV.  For a comprehensive overview of the history and doctrine of institutional free exer-
cise, see Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church 
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1388–1414 (1981).  
For in-depth analysis of different theoretical justifications for institutional free exercise, see John 
Infranca, Institutional Free Exercise and Religious Land Use, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1718–26 
(2013) (proposing and expounding on intrinsic, derivative, and pragmatic justifications). 
[Vol. 48: 175, 2021] The Right to Conscience vs. The Right to Die 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
179 
II. STATE OF THE LAW: CONSCIENCE AND PAD 
A. The Fight for Medical Freedom of Conscience 
When the United States House of Representatives drafted the First 
Amendment and offered it to the Senate for review, their suggested bundle 
of religious freedoms included a “Conscience Clause” alongside the two re-
ligion clauses Americans know and love today: “Congress shall make no law 
establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall the 
rights of conscience be infringed.”9  After considerable debate over the is-
sue, the Senate ratified the First Amendment without the House’s third reli-
gion clause,10 but the debate over “the rights of conscience” had only just 
begun, and continues to this day.11 
Conscience is difficult, but not impossible, to define apart from reli-
gion.12  It is a universal faculty, an innate, human instinct that links human 
 
 9. S. JOURNAL, 1ST CONGRESS, 1ST SESS. 63 (1789) (emphasis added).  This draft reflects 
James Madison’s initial proposal for the religion clauses, which he suggested inserting into the Con-
stitution itself:  
That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these clauses, to wit: 
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor 
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience 
be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.  
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).  Madison considered the individual con-
science “the most sacred of all property.”  James Madison, Politcal Essay: Property, NAT’L 
GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 223 (Ralph 
Ketcham ed. 2006). 
 10. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757–59, 795–96 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“Debate on Estab-
lishment of Religion and Rights of Conscience”).  The critical difference between “conscience” and 
“religion,” which would have been well-known to the authors of the First Amendment, is that con-
science “emphasizes individual judgment” and religion “encompasses the corporate or institutional 
aspects of religious belief.”  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of 
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1490 (1990).  The deliberate choice to constitu-
tionally safeguard communal “religion” instead of individual “conscience” bolsters the doctrine of 
institutional free exercise, which protects claims brought on behalf of a religious collective.  Id. at 
1490 (“Religion binds believers together; conscience refers to the inner faculty of judgment.”). 
 11. Pellegrino, supra note 6, at 231 (“[T]he recent erosion of the number of beliefs held in com-
mon, and the increasingly varied demography of our nation, has magnified the complexity and depth 
of our differences about what is morally right and wrong.  The secular solution of moral or value 
neutrality has generated genuine conflicts of conscience.”). 
 12. Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 
1490 (2013) (“Conscience is not a source of moral law, but it applies moral knowledge—whether 
that knowledge is shaped by religious beliefs or not.”).  It is doubtful, however, whether it is useful 
to isolate religion from conscience in First Amendment analysis, or whether that feat is possible at 
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morality with human experience, “issu[ing] judgments [against] past actions 
and issu[ing] commands with respect to contemplated future actions.”13  This 
faculty does not necessarily require religious beliefs: “On a Venn diagram, 
conscience and religion would overlap, not overlay.”14  Like religion, con-
science neither fears nor flees scientific scrutiny; however, like religion, 
conscience often operates in the unmeasurable, and therefore unscientific, 
realms of experience and faith—while conscience rarely counsels against 
human reason, it regularly extends beyond human reason.15  Within the med-
ical field, conscience protections for healthcare workers and institutions are 
of paramount importance, regardless of religious affiliation or lack thereof, 
because, unlike most professions, the role of doctors is to directly influence 
the length and quality of human lives.16  Unsurprisingly, as medical technol-
ogy increases, the ethical stakes will continue to compound exponentially.17  
 
all.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of Religious Free-
dom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1610–20 (1997) (book review).  Analyzing the logic and phi-
losophy underlying the religion clauses, Professor Paulsen notes: 
[T]he religion clauses . . . entail a series of essentially religious premises: God exists; 
God makes claims on the loyalty of human beings; these claims sometimes require action 
that may conflict with government regulation; the claims of God are, for the individual 
believer, prior to and superior in obligation to the claims of the state; and—this is the 
crucial point—even from the state’s perspective, the claims of the state ordinarily should 
yield to the claims of God as sincerely articulated by the religious believer, because the 
claims of God rightfully have a stronger claim on human loyalty than do the claims of the 
state.  In short, the religion clauses are God-fearing clauses.  The law thinks that God ex-
ists and that He makes demands (rules, duties, prohibitions) on men, and that this reality 
requires the state to yield. 
Id. at 1611 (footnote omitted). 
 13. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1490 (arriving at this idea by way of Locke: “[E]veryone has a 
conscience that applies whatever moral knowledge they possess,” but “people may discover their 
moral obligations by reason alone . . . .”). 
 14. Id. at 1491 (concluding that conscience “is an exercise of moral judgment—whether in-
formed by religious beliefs or not”). 
 15. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES 6 (2016) (“Increasingly, enemies of 
what James Madison called the ‘sacred rights of conscience’ cloak themselves in the mantle of sci-
ence to marginalize their opponents.  But close scrutiny reveals that it is their own views that are 
thinly supported—that are, as they might say dismissively, nothing but articles of faith.”).  For a dis-
cussion of the inherently spiritual dimension of the healthcare industry, see infra Section IV.B.I. 
 16. See Pellegrino, supra note 6, at 231 (In the physician’s “perception of professional ethics” 
and “personal set of moral beliefs . . . we confront such crucial issues as the licitness of abortion, 
euthanasia, assisted suicide, in vitro fertilization, and stem cell research—the whole Pandora’s box 
of ‘human life’ issues, emerging from our unprecedented control of every phase of human life.  
These issues center on how we value human life itself, its purposes, quality, destiny, and utility.”). 
 17. See id. at 221, 224–25 (“To what extent can [conscience rules] secure rights of conscience in 
the face of a liberal, democratic, and secular society’s commitments to moral relativism, personal 
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The concept of medical conscience protection began evolving decades ago 
as a direct response to this new and fundamental threat.18 
The first significant piece of conscience-protecting legislation for medi-
cal professionals, the 1973 Church Amendments, was designed in response 
to the legalization of the most controversial practice in the field of American 
medicine: abortion.19  Following Roe v. Wade’s judicial declaration of a con-
stitutional right to abortion, members of the medical community who refused 
to perform abortions became conscientious objectors, overnight, to the 
Court’s new ethical norms.20  The Church Amendments addressed this new 
conscience threat, and were bolstered in 1996 when Congress passed the 
Coats-Snowe Amendment, which shielded conscientious medical students 
and healthcare entities from mandatory abortion training.21  In 2004, Con-
 
freedom of choice, and an implicit social contract with its professionals?”). 
 18. See id. at 231 (“Conflicts of belief in [the ‘human life’ issues] are more profound and deeply 
felt in one’s conscience than other issues of professional behavior with patients.  For religious indi-
viduals of many persuasions, these issues bear directly on their personal spiritual destinies and are, 
therefore, least subject to compromise.”). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2) (2018).  The Church Amendments guaranteed that no hospital 
could be required to “make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization procedure 
or abortion if the performance of such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by the 
entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions.”  Id.; see also Angela C. Carmella, 
Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Political-Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA. 
L. REV. 1, 68 (2017) (“Forty-four states have . . . enacted conscience clauses [since 1974] that also 
protect the refusal to provide abortions . . . .”).  The sponsor of the Church Amendments, Idaho Sen-
ator Frank Church, stated that they were a response to Roe v. Wade.  119 CONG. REC. 9,595 (1973).  
In Roe itself, the Supreme Court quoted the American Medical Association House of Delegates reso-
lution that “no physician or other professional personnel shall be compelled to perform any act 
which violates his good medical judgment.  Neither physician, hospital, nor hospital personnel shall 
be required to perform any act violative of personally-held moral principles.”  410 U.S. 113, 144–45 
n.38 (1973) (emphasis added).  In Doe v. Bolton, the companion case decided the same day as Roe, 
the Court gave a nod of approval to the conscience protection in the statute at issue, which allowed 
“a physician or any other employee . . . the right to refrain, for moral or religious reasons, from par-
ticipating in the abortion procedure” because this “afford[ed] appropriate protection to the individual 
and to the denominational hospital.”  410 U.S. 179, 197–98 (1973) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
 20. See Pellegrino, supra note 6, at 224–25 (noting that the Catholic Church’s “positions on 
many crucial issues are distinctly and unapologetically ethically counter-cultural” and adding that 
“[m]any Jewish, Protestant, and Moslem physicians share some of the same beliefs and experience 
equivalent challenges to their moral integrity”); see also Leslie Steven Rothenberg, The Role of 
Judges and the Courts as Definers of Ethical Norms, SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE ANNUAL 
MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS) 104, 104 (1977) (providing “a brief historical 
review of the manner in which U.S. courts have defined ethical norms in diverse factual situations”). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a) (2018).  This Amendment responded to new standards created by the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, which had mandated “experience with elec-
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gress responded to attempts to construe the term “health care entity” in con-
science protections as protecting only individuals by broadening conscience 
protection with the Weldon Amendment, which explicitly guarantees con-
scientious healthcare institutions the same protections as individuals.22  This 
haven for institutional free exercise was passed as part of the original appro-
priations for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and “has 
been readopted (or incorporated by reference) in [every] HHS appropriations 
act” thereafter.23 
In December 2008, outgoing President George W. Bush issued a sweep-
ing and comprehensive Conscience Rule through HHS, set to take effect on 
the day of incoming President Barack Obama’s inauguration.24  This unify-
ing rule collected all the protections afforded among the Church, Coats-
Snowe, and Weldon Amendments, as well as protections appearing else-
where throughout federal law, and codified them in a single, cohesive rule.25  
The 2008 Conscience Rule also gave the scattered and oft-ignored con-
science protections the power of enforceability by requiring recipients of 
HHS funding to provide a “[w]ritten certification of compliance” with the 
rule and by designating HHS’s Office of Civil Rights as the coordinator of 
handling complaints under the new rule.26  These new features would have 
fortified conscience rights and added layers of much-needed accountability 
to ensure compliance with the rule, but the 2008 Conscience Rule never took 
effect—President Obama struck it down as one of his first actions in office.27 
 
tive abortion [as] a required component of an approved residency training program”—a requirement 
that, while contingent on a resident’s willingness to participate, had previously been both purely vol-
untary and unnecessary for residency accreditation.  142 Cong. Rec. S2271 (1996) (statement of the 
Amendment’s sponsor, Indiana Senator Dan Coats). 
 22. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, Tit. V, § 508(d)(2), 118 Stat. 
2809, 3163 (2004); see also Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Healthcare, 84 Fed. Reg. 
23170, 23172 (May 21, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) (detailing the statutory history and 
implications of the HHS appropriations, and in particular, the Weldon Amendment). 
 23. Office for Civil Rights, Conscience Protections for Health Care Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/conscience/conscience-
protections/index.html. 
 24. Rob Stein, Rule Shields Health Workers Who Withhold Care Based on Beliefs, WASH. POST, 
(Dec 19, 2008), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/18/ 
AR2008121801556.html. 
 25. Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or 
Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78072, 78072 (Dec. 
19, 2008), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-12-19/pdf/E8-30134.pdf. 
 26. Id. at 78097, 78098, and 78101. 
 27. Rescission of the Regulation Entitled “Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Ser-
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Despite his initial hostility towards the 2008 Conscience Rule, President 
Obama was later responsible for furthering conscience protection via a pro-
vision in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, in a section titled “Prohi-
bition against discrimination on assisted suicide”28: 
The Federal Government, and any State or local govern-
ment . . . may not subject an individual or institutional health care 
entity to discrimination on the basis that the entity does not provide 
any health care item or service furnished for the purpose of causing, 
or for the purpose of assisting in causing, the death of any individu-
al, such as by assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.29 
The ACA contains the first conscience protection to specifically men-
tion PAD, likely prompting the inclusion of PAD in virtually all modern 
protective laws alongside other procedures known for inciting conscientious 
objection.30 
In January 2018, the Trump administration’s HHS announced an un-
precedented new division in its Office of Civil Rights: The Conscience and 
Religious Freedom Division.31  In May 2019, this division issued a new 
Conscience Rule, designed to “protect providers, individuals, and other 
healthcare entities from having to provide, participate in, pay for, provide 
 
vices Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal 
Law,” 74 Fed. Reg. 10207 (Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2009-03-10/pdf/E9-5067.pdf. 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 18113(a) (Supp. IV 2010).  The ACA defines the term “health care entity” as 
including “an individual physician or other health care professional, [and] a hospital.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 18113(b) (Supp. IV 2010).  Although the ACA refers to PAD as “assisted suicide” (a term consid-
ered highly objectionable to proponents and purposefully excluded from each state statute concern-
ing the subject), the practice referenced in § 1811(a) was undoubtedly intended to encompass PAD 
as modern statutes define it.  42 U.S.C. § 18113(a) (Supp. IV 2010); see infra Section III.B. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 18113(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (emphasis added). 
 30. See, e.g., Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support 
Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78072, 
supra note 25, at 78076 (protecting, in the 2008 proposed rule, traditionally objectionable medical 
procedures including “abortion” and “sterilization,” but declining to protect conscience objections to 
“assisted suicide”). 
 31. Office for Civil Rights, HHS Announces New Conscience and Religious Freedom Division, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/ 
2018/01/18/hhs-ocr-announces-new-conscience-and-religious-freedom-division.html.  This division 
was created in response to Executive Order 13798, issued by President Trump in May 2017, which 
instructs government agencies to “address conscience-based objections” of healthcare workers.  Ex-
ec. Order No. 13798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (May 4, 2017). 
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coverage of, or refer for,” among other things, “assisted suicide.”32  In addi-
tion to defining critical terms and creating enforcement mechanisms, the 
newest conscience rule required extensive recordkeeping to further guaran-
tee accountability.33  The rule was set to take effect in July 2019, but the im-
plementation was delayed until November 2019 “[in] light of significant liti-
gation over the rule.”34  This litigation, initiated by a coalition of twenty 
states, Planned Parenthood, and other special interest groups, resulted in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York vacating the rule entire-
ly.35  Although many significant and ongoing efforts exist at the federal level 
to protect conscience rights in healthcare, when it comes to the specific med-
ical practice of PAD, the most important conscience clashes are unfolding 
state by state.36 
  
 
 32. HHS Press Office, HHS Announces Final Conscience Rule Protecting Health Care Entities 
and Individuals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (May 2, 2019), https://www.hhs. 
gov/about/news/2019/05/02/hhs-announces-final-conscience-rule-protecting-health-care-entities-
and-individuals.html.  Explaining the need for a new conscience rule, HHS cited a “significant in-
crease” in conscience-related complaints since November 2016, and expressed hope that the new 
rule would provide “the proper enforcement tools” to ensure adequate conscience protections for 
healthcare entities.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Office for Civil Rights, Conscience Rule Effective Date Moved to Nov. 22, 2019, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 3, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/conscience/conscience-rule-
effective-date-moved/index.html. 
 35. New York v. United States HHS, 414 F. Supp. 3d 475, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also Office 
for Civil Rights, Conscience Rule Vacated, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (Nov. 8, 
2019), https://www.hhs.gov/conscience/conscience-rule-vacated/index.html (“Under court order, the 
2019 rule will remain vacated and not in effect unless OCR receives further direction from the 
courts.”); Benjamin Weiser & Margot Sanger-Katz, Judge Voids Trump-Backed ‘Conscience Rule’ 
for Health Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/upshot/ 
trump-conscience-rule-overturned.html. 
 36. See infra Part II.B.2.  Skirmishes over conscience protection will undoubtedly continue at the 
federal level and, although the dust has not yet settled, public favor for a blanket, federal conscience 
protection for healthcare workers has long been, and currently remains, widespread.  See, e.g., Rich-
ard S. Myers, On Law: On the Need for a Federal Conscience Clause, 1 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 
23, 25 (2001) (“A comprehensive assault on religious liberty, and this is in truth what we are facing, 
really warrants a comprehensive remedy.  A federal law providing for full protection for those with 
conscientious objection to being forced to participate, through funding or otherwise, in health care 
activities that violate their religious and moral beliefs is well worth supporting.”). 
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B. Current Status of PAD Laws in the United States 
In the United States, the exact definition of PAD37 varies from state to 
state, but all state statutes require that a patient seeking PAD must: (1) be at 
least 18 years old and a resident of the state, (2) be mentally and physically 
capable of self-administering the medication, (3) have a terminal disease that 
is overwhelmingly likely to cause death in six months or less as determined 
by two physicians, and (4) have voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die 
both orally and in writing.38 
After Oregon became the first state to legalize PAD in 1994, only two 
other states, Washington and Vermont, followed suit over the next two dec-
ades; however, since 2016, the pace of legalization has been accelerating 
rapidly, with five states and the District of Columbia legalizing PAD in just 
three years.39  Currently, PAD is legal by statute in eight states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and legal by judicial decision in one state, Montana.40  
PAD is currently not legalized in the other forty-one states: thirty-four have 
 
 37. It is critical to note that PAD is distinct from the practice of euthanasia, which remains illegal 
in all 50 states.  Alyssa Thurston, Physician-Assisted Death: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, 111 
L. LIBR. J. 31, 35, 39 (2019).  Euthanasia is defined as a doctor administering fatal medication to a 
patient, such as by injection.  Id. at 32.  Each state statute legalizing PAD clearly and unequivocally 
excludes euthanasia using a nearly identical clause: “Nothing in this article authorizes a physician or 
any other person to end an individual’s life by lethal injection, mercy killing, or euthanasia.”  COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 25-48-121 (2016).  Equally critical is the distinction between PAD and the patient’s 
right to refuse further treatment, which is legal in all 50 states.  Patient Self-Determination Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101–508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (requiring hospitals that receive 
federal funds to tell patients that they have a right to demand or refuse treatment); see also Cruzan v. 
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990) (holding that doctors may remove patients from 
life support after clear and convincing evidence of their prior wishes to do so, leading to the creation 
of advance health directives); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976) (parents permitted to remove daughter 
in persistent vegetative state from ventilator); Robert P. George, Terri Schiavo: A Right to Life De-
nied or a Right to Die Honored?, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 419, 425–26 (2005) (discussing and criticiz-
ing the famous—or infamous—right-to-die case of Terri Schiavo, a vegetative patient whose feeding 
tube was removed after over a decade of litigation).  Additionally, the Supreme Court distinguished 
PAD from refusing treatment in Washington v. Glucksberg: “The decision to commit suicide with 
the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.”  521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997).  The 
precise terminology for this practice is also fiercely contested for emotional and political reasons.  
See infra Section III. 
 38. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 127.805 § 2.01(1) (1994); see also OR. REV. STAT. 127.805 
§ 2.01(1) (1994); OR. REV. STAT. 127.815 § 3.01 (1994). 
 39. See infra Sections II.B.2.a.–j. (California (2016); Colorado (2016); Washington, D.C. (2017); 
Hawaii (2018); New Jersey (2019); and Maine (2019)). 
 40. See infra Section II.B.2. 
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laws prohibiting PAD, three prohibit PAD by common law, and four have 
no specific law or are unclear as to the legality of PAD.41 
1. Glucksberg and Quill: No Constitutionally Protected “Right to Die” 
In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld state-wide bans on PAD in Wash-
ington and New York in two cases decided contemporaneously: Washington 
v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill.42 
In Glucksberg, the Court examined the specific issue of “whether the 
‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to 
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,” and 
concluded that “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices do not 
support the existence of such a right.”43  The Court further found that the 
constitutional requirement “that Washington’s assisted-suicide ban be ra-
tionally related to legitimate government interests” was “unquestionably 
met,” because “Washington has an ‘unqualified interest in the preservation 
of human life’” and its “prohibition on assisted suicide, like all homicide 
laws, both reflects and advances its commitment to this interest.”44  Thus, 
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s finding of a “constitutionally-
recognized ‘right to die,’” entrusting the “extensive and serious evaluation of 
physician-assisted suicide” to the “‘laboratory’ of the States.”45 
Simultaneous with its rejection of Glucksberg’s argument for PAD 
based on the Due Process Clause, in Vacco v. Quill the Supreme Court also 
rejected an argument for PAD based on the Equal Protection Clause.46  Re-
sponding to a group of New York doctors arguing that “the distinction be-
tween refusing lifesaving medical treatment and assisted suicide is ‘arbi-
trary’ and ‘irrational,’” the Court ruled that “[l]ogic and contemporary 
 
 41. See States with Legal Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG, https://euthanasia.procon. 
org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last updated July 25, 2019) (citing common law prohi-
bitions in Alabama, Massachusetts, and West Virginia; no specific law or unclear laws in Nevada, 
North Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming; and explicit prohibitions in the remaining thirty-four states). 
 42. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rejecting a challenge by Washington physicians and patients, along 
with non-profit Compassion in Dying, to Washington’s Natural Death Act of 1979, which banned 
PAD); 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (upholding New York anti-PAD law and finding no constitutional “right 
to die”). 
 43. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723, 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 728 (citation omitted). 
 45. Id. at 709 (majority opinion), 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 46. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793. 
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practice support . . . treat[ing] them differently.”47  The Court also noted that 
“[b]y permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treatment while pro-
hibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law follows a longstand-
ing and rational distinction.”48  Through these two cases, the Supreme Court 
clearly established that Americans do not have any constitutional right to 
PAD, and the ultimate decisions regarding the practice must therefore be de-
cided on a state-by-state basis.49 
2. Current State of the Experiment in “The Laboratory of the States” 
The following chronological list documents the history of PAD legaliza-
tion in the United States.50  As the list illustrates, the pro-PAD movement 
has generated an accelerating wave of well-funded ballot initiatives and 
heavily lobbied state statutes to overcome resistance from deeply rooted 
public disapproval of PAD and to overpower sustained opposition from con-
scientious religious groups.51 
a. Oregon (1994) 
Oregon legalized PAD in 1994 via ballot initiative, with citizens approv-
ing the measure by the narrowest possible margin: 51% for and 49% 
against.52  However, due to a judge’s injunction, extended political and legal 
proceedings, and a second ballot initiative attempting to repeal the measure, 
the Oregon Death With Dignity Act (DWDA) was not implemented until 
1998.53  Attempts to overrule the new DWDA continued at the federal level, 
 
 47. Id. at 807–08. 
 48. Id. at 808. 
 49. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735 (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest 
and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.  Our 
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”). 
 50. See infra Sections II.B.2.a.–j. 
 51. See generally Thurston, supra note 37.  
 52. Physician-Assisted Death Initiative (1994), Oregon Measure 16 (1994) (approved 51.31% to 
48.69%); see also K.K. DuVivier, Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death: The Role 
of Direct Democracy in Federalism, 86 OR. L. REV. 895 (2007) (discussing the efficacy of ballot 
initiatives to pass moral legislation). 
 53. OR. REV. STAT. 127.885 § 4 (1994); see also Kathryn L. Tucker, When Dying Takes Too 
Long: Activism for Social Change to Protect and Expand Choice at the End of Life, 33 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 109, 115–21 (2011).  Professor Tucker, former Director of Legal Affairs at national pro-PAD 
non-profit Compassion & Choices, studied the Oregon ballot initiative’s success in the wake of 
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culminating in the 2006 Supreme Court ruling in Gonzalez v. Oregon, where 
the Court ruled that the Controlled Substances Act did not prohibit Oregon 
doctors from distributing federally controlled substances for the purpose of 
assisting an individual’s suicide.54  After this challenge was defeated, no fur-
ther legal challenges remained and Oregon’s DWDA has functioned unim-
peded ever since.55  Since implementation, it has become a template for PAD 
laws across the nation.56 
b. Washington (2008) 
The first attempt to legalize PAD in Washington was a failed ballot ini-
tiative in 1991, in which the citizens rejected the measure 54% to 46%.57  
After Oregon implemented its DWDA and resolved its various legal chal-
lenges, however, a coalition of pro-PAD organizations identified Washing-
 
Washington and California voters’ rejection of PAD, noting that “Oregon learned from these cam-
paigns across its borders and tailored its measure to pass . . . .”  Id. at 115. 
 54. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).  Dissenting, Justice Scalia summarized the somewhat circular logic of 
the majority, which “conclude[d] that the Attorney General [of Oregon] lacked authority to declare 
assisted suicide illicit under the Controlled Substances Act . . . because [the Act] is concerned only 
with illicit drug dealing and trafficking,” and the drugs used to perform assisted suicide were no 
longer “illicit” under Oregon law.  Id. at 275 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 55. For a detailed account of Oregon’s implementation of PAD, see NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE 
FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 115–25 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006).  In the first 
five years after implementation, 198 lethal prescriptions were written in Oregon, and this number 
increased by 76 percent from 1999 to 2002.  Id. at 119.  A high volume of prescriptions appeared to 
come from “a very small handful of politically active physicians.”  Id.  Justice Gorsuch, writing in 
the year of his appointment to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, documented a troubling footnote 
in the early history of PAD in America:  
In its first-year questionnaire, the Oregon Health Division specifically asked physicians 
whether the patients they helped kill were referred to them by advocacy organizations, 
such as Compassion in Dying or the Hemlock Society, but the state inexplicably declined 
to publish the answer.  However, it was later revealed by the media that . . . at least 
twelve of fourteen, or 86 percent, of the assisted suicide cases were handled by groups 
politically active in promoting legalization of assisted suicide . . . . Just as it is inexplica-
ble that Oregon would suppress results from its first-year questionnaire, it is equally trou-
bling that the state has chosen to drop this question from each of its subsequent annual 
surveys, and to do so without public mention (let alone defense) of its decision . . . . 
Id. at 119–20 (citations omitted). 
 56. See Thurston, supra note 37, at 43 (“The provisions of Oregon’s DWDA have provided a 
model for other state laws that have since legalized physician-assisted suicide.”). 
 57. Washington Physician-Assisted Death, Initiative 119 (1991) (rejected 53.6% to 46.4%). 
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ton as the next state to target for legalization.58  In 2008, Initiative 1000 was 
put before Washington voters after the first pro-PAD campaign in history in 
which the proponent’s fundraising exceeded that of their opponents.59  Vot-
ers approved the measure 58% to 42%, and the Washington DWDA, virtual-
ly identical in substance to the Oregon DWDA, was implemented in March 
2009.60 
c. Montana (2009) 
PAD has been legal in Montana since the 2009 case Baxter v. Montana, 
where the Montana Supreme Court found nothing in the state’s law that 
would prohibit a physician from offering PAD to a patient.61  Citing Mon-
tana’s Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, the court took an unprecedented ju-
dicial stance that remains unique to this day, holding that there is no discern-
able public policy difference between taking a patient off life support and 
prescribing lethal medication to kill that patient.62  Since Baxter, numerous 
bills have been introduced in the Montana state legislature both to ban PAD 
 
 58. Attempts to Legalize Euthanasia/Assisted-Suicide in the United States, PATIENTS RIGHTS 
COUNCIL, http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/failed-attempts-usa/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2020) 
(“It took fourteen years [after Oregon] before another state legalized [PAD], and, even then, only 
after advocates spent a whole year preparing the campaign and raising millions of dollars to insure 
the victory they so desperately wanted.  That state was Washington, the state consultants said was 
demographically most like Oregon and, therefore, most likely to favor assisted suicide.”).  By the 
time of the vote on the next initiative, the pro-PAD campaign had raised $4,890,020, with $300,000 
coming from the single largest contributor, then-Governor of Washington Booth Gardner.  Washing-
ton Death with Dignity Act: A History, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NATIONAL CENTER, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/189washington-death-with-dignity-act-history/ (last visited Oct. 
29, 2020). 
 59. Washington Death with Dignity Act, Initiative Measure No. 1000 (2008) (approved 57.82% 
to 42.18%). 
 60. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245 (2008). 
 61. 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).  In Baxter, a patient dying of lymphocytic leukemia, four phy-
sicians, and Compassion & Choices challenged the application of a Montana homicide statute 
against a physician providing life-ending medication.  Id. at 1213–14.  The Montana Supreme Court 
declined to rule on the district court’s finding that the Montana State Constitution’s guaranteed rights 
of privacy and dignity entitled Montanans to the “right to die.”  Id. at 1214; see also MONT. CONST. 
art. II, §§ 4, 10 (guaranteeing Montana citizens the right of “[i]ndividual dignity” and of “privacy.”). 
 62. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1217 (“The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act very clearly provides that 
terminally ill patients are entitled to autonomous, end-of-life decisions, even if enforcement of those 
decisions involves direct acts by a physician.  Furthermore, there is no indication in the Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act that an additional means of giving effect to a patient’s decision—in which the 
patient, without any direct assistance, chooses the time of his own death—is against public policy.”). 
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and to legalize it via statute, but none have been successful thus far.63 
d. Vermont (2013) 
Almost two decades after Oregon’s successful ballot initiative, Vermont 
became the first state to legalize PAD through the legislative process.64  Pre-
vious PAD bills had failed in Vermont in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2005, 
2007, 2009, and 2011, but activist groups organized sufficient awareness and 
fundraising to finally pass Act 39, Patient Choice and Control at End of Life, 
in 2013.65  Sparks flew within three years: the Vermont Board of Medical 
Practice and the Office of Professional Regulation published their own in-
terpretation of Act 39, in which the state agencies construed the Act as re-
quiring doctors to either counsel all terminal patients of their new right to 
PAD or, if unwilling to do so, refer the patient to another source for infor-
mation concerning PAD.66  After Vermont healthcare workers filed a com-
plaint in 2016 in the Federal District Court in Vermont, the state entered into 
a Consent Agreement and Stipulation establishing that the state agencies’ 
interpretation of the statute was false and requiring it to “revise all State-
owned web sites that describe a medical professional’s obligations with re-
spect to [Act 39], in accordance with [the] agreement.”67  The district court 
 
 63. See, e.g., H.B. 284, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019) (attempting to ban PAD); H.B. 536, 
65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017); see also S.B. 202, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2015) (attempt-
ing to legalize PAD); S.B. 167, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011), S.B. 220, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mont. 2013). 
 64. See Kathryn L. Tucker, Vermont’s Patient Choice at End of Life Act: A Historic “Next Gen-
eration” Law Governing Aid in Dying, 38 VT. L. REV. 687, 687 (2014) (“A ‘next generation’ model 
for legislation, . . . the [Act] is of historic significance . . . because this is the first time a legislature 
has adopted a statute specifically permitting aid in dying.”). 
 65. VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, § 113 (2013); Attempts to Legalize Euthanasia/Assisted-Suicide in 
the United States, supra note 58. 
 66. Steven H. Aden, Vermont Health Professionals: Don’t Force Us to Help Kill Our Patients, 
ALL. DEFENDING FREEDOM (July 20, 2016), http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/10027.  The 
state of Vermont contrived this requirement using Vermont’s “Patient’s Bill of Rights for Palliative 
Care and Pain Management” (incorporated by Act 39), which guarantees the right of “[a] patient 
with a terminal illness . . . to be informed by a clinician of all available options related to terminal 
care; to be able to request any, all, or none of these options; and to expect and receive supportive 
care for the specific option or options available.”  VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, § 1871 (2017) (emphasis 
added).  See also Pellegrino, supra note 6, at 239–40 (“To cooperate in an act which is regarded as 
inherently morally wrong, such as arranging for an abortion or assisted suicide, is to be a moral ac-
complice. . . .  Obviously the patient cannot be abandoned, legally or morally, and must be cared for 
until a transfer has been effected.”) (citation omitted). 
 67. Consent Agreement and Stipulation, Vt. All. For Ethical Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoser, No. 5:16-
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denied a motion from Compassion & Choices to strike the agreement from 
public records, but carefully noted that “[t]he agreement does not represent 
the views of the court,” and that the 2016 armistice was “not a judicial rul-
ing”—pointedly leaving the adjudicative door ajar for future examination.68 
e. California (2016) 
The Californian pro-PAD movement began in 1980, when Derek 
Humphrey established the Hemlock Society in Santa Monica, California, 
advocating for PAD and distributing “how-to-die information.”69  Within a 
decade, membership in the Hemlock Society had grown to over 50,000 sup-
porters.70  In 2005, the Society merged with Compassion in Dying, another 
national pro-PAD non-profit, to form Compassion & Choices, the largest 
pro-PAD organization in the United States, which continues to tirelessly and 
strategically fund, litigate, and lobby PAD efforts in every state.71 
After many attempts to legalize PAD failed at various stages in the Cali-
fornia legislature, public sentiment began to shift in 2014 with the story of 
Brittany Maynard, widely circulated through a publicity campaign with 
Compassion & Choices.72  Maynard, a twenty-nine year-old Californian di-
agnosed with incurable brain cancer, advocated legalization of PAD in Cali-
fornia, taking her case before the state legislature and the governor.73  After 
her attempts were unsuccessful, she moved to Oregon for access to legal 
 
cv-205, 2016 WL 7015717 (D. Vt. 2016).  Despite this agreement, the FAQ page for the state-run 
Vermont Ethics Network continues to assert that the “voluntariness clause” of Act 39 “does not alter 
the rights and duties existing under Vermont’s Patient’s Bill of Rights,” erroneously indicating that 
referrals may still be a requirement under Vermont law.  Physician Assisted Death (PAD), VT. 
ETHICS NETWORK, https://vtethicsnetwork.org/medical-ethics/pad (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).   
 68. Order on Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion to Strike Docket Entry #57 (2017), Hoser, 2016 
WL 7015717 (denying motion from Compassion & Choices, defendant-intervenor, to strike the Con-
sent Agreement from public records and noting that the agreement is not the court’s opinion on this 
issue). 
 69. Death with Dignity in California: A History, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NATIONAL CENTER, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/death-with-dignity-california-history/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2020). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See History of the End-of-Life Choice Movement, COMPASSION & CHOICES, 
https://compassionandchoices.org/resource/history-end-life-choice-movement/ (last visited Oct. 29, 
2020). 
 72. See id. (recounting the results of the publicity campaign, during which “coverage from every 
major news outlet catalyze[d] . . . a nationwide conversation” on PAD). 
 73. See Death with Dignity in California: A History, supra note 69. 
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PAD, which she used to end her life in 2014.74  Less than three months after 
Maynard’s death, the California Senate introduced the bill that would ulti-
mately become the End of Life Option Act (ELOA), enacted in 2016.75  The 
ELOA has been implemented despite facing immediate legal challenges, and 
has remained continuously embattled in California state courts ever since.76 
f. Colorado (2016) 
After two attempts to pass bills in the state legislature were defeated, 
Colorado eventually legalized PAD using a ballot initiative, with voters 
passing Proposition 106, the End of Life Options Act, 65% to 35%.77  The 
new law went into effect in December 2016, marking the first time two 
states legalized PAD in the same year.78 
g. Washington, D.C. (2017) 
The D.C. Death with Dignity Act, approved by the District of Columbia 
Council and signed by D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser in 2016, went into effect 
in February 2017.79  Since then, Congress has initiated multiple, unsuccess-
ful attempts to repeal the Act.80 
h. Hawaii (2018) 
After multiple failed bills in the state legislature, Compassion & Choices 
contended that PAD had been legal in Hawaii since 1909 based on an ob-
scure Hawaiian territorial law.81  After the Hawaii Attorney General rejected 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. End of Life Option Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2016). 
 76. See, e.g., People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court, 240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2018) (petition for review, S253424, denied by the California Supreme Court,); see also Death with 
Dignity in California: A History, supra note 69. 
 77. Colorado Physician-Assisted Death Initiative (2016), Colorado Proposition 106 (2016) (ap-
proved 64.87% to 35.13%). 
 78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-101 (2016). 
 79. D.C. Act 21-577 (2016) (to be codified at D.C. CODE § 21-182); see also Thurston, supra 
note 37, at 41. 
 80. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 27, 115th Cong. (2018); S.J. Res. 4, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 81. Andrew Walden, Colette Machado: I Look at Kalaupapa––Native Hawaiians Will Fight 
Against Assisted Suicide, HAWAI’I FREE PRESS (Dec. 10, 2011, 6:35 PM), 
http://www.hawaiifreepress.com/ArticlesMain/tabid/56/ID/5639/Colette-Machado-I-look-at-
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these claims, pro-PAD groups began pushing PAD bills in Hawaii’s state 
legislature—with at least five in 2017 and four in 2018—until the Hawaii 
Our Care, Our Choice Act passed in 2018.82 
i. New Jersey (2019) 
The Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act took effect in New Jersey 
on August 1, 2019, and is currently in effect pending litigation.83 
j. Maine (2019) 
On June 12, 2019, Maine Governor Janet Mills signed the Maine Death 
with Dignity Act, making Maine the most recent state to enact PAD legaliza-
tion.84  Although the Christian Civic League of Maine filed a petition to re-
peal the Act using a ballot initiative, they failed to gather enough signatures 
and the Act took effect in September 2019.85 
III. SETTING THE STAGE FOR AN ASSAULT ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
A. Catholic Hospitals Are the Greatest Obstacle for PAD Legalization in 
America 
On October 28, 2019, global leaders representing Islam, Judaism, and 
Christianity (including Protestant, Orthodox, and Catholic Christians) united 
at the Vatican to sign a joint statement unequivocally opposing assisted sui-
cide.86  Organized by the Vatican’s Pontifical Academy for Life and coordi-
 
Kalaupapa-Native-Hawaiians-will-fight-against-Assisted-Suicide.aspx; see also Kathryn L. Tucker, 
Aid in Dying: An End of Life-Option Governed by Best Practices, 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 9, 
10–26 (2012). 
 82. H.B. 2739, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018) (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L (2019)); 
for failed attempts, see Attempts to Legalize Euthanasia/Assisted-Suicide in the United States, supra 
note 58. 
 83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16 (2019); New Jersey, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NATIONAL CENTER, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/new-jersey/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2020). 
 84. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 418 (2019). 
 85. Maine, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NATIONAL CENTER, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/ 
maine/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2020). 
 86. Robin Gomes, Abrahamic Religions: No to Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide, Yes to Palliative 
Care, VATICAN NEWS (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2019-
10/abrahamic-religions-life-euthanasia-suicide-palliative.html. 
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nated by Archbishop Vincenzo Paglia, the interfaith group drafted a declara-
tion to “oppose any form of . . . physician assisted suicide—that is the direct, 
deliberate and intentional support of committing suicide—because [it] fun-
damentally contradict[s] the inalienable value of human life.”87  The state-
ment maintained that PAD “should be forbidden without exceptions,” noting 
that “[m]atters pertaining to the duration and meaning of human life should 
not be in the domain of health care providers,” and concluded that caring for 
the sick “demands of us also to reform the structures and institutions by 
which health and religious care are delivered.”88 
The basis for Catholic opposition to PAD, and thus the Vatican’s moti-
vation to organize this event, is the Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services (“the ERDs”) issued by the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops.89  Catholic healthcare workers and institu-
tions look to the ERDs rather than to their respective governments for their 
moral guidelines, and the ERDs unequivocally forbid participation in certain 
medical procedures, including abortion, sterilization, euthanasia, and, since 
2001, PAD.90  As extensions of the Catholic Church itself, Catholic hospitals 
provide care in accordance with the ERDs, thereby expanding the governing 
authority of the ERDs from individual doctors to the moral framework of 
entire healthcare institutions owned or operated by the Catholic Church.91  
 
 87. Position Paper of the Abrahamic Monotheistic Religions on Matters Concerning the End of 




 88. Id. 
 89. Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, UNITED STATES 
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (6th ed., 2018), http://www.usccb.org/about/doctrine/ethical-
and-religious-directives/upload/ethical-religious-directives-catholic-health-service-sixth-edition-
2016-06.pdf [hereinafter ERDs]. 
 90. Id. at 25.  Justifying this practice, the ERDs elaborate: “We have a duty to preserve our life 
and to use it for the glory of God, but the duty to preserve life is not absolute, for we may reject life-
prolonging procedures that are insufficiently beneficial or excessively burdensome.  Suicide and 
euthanasia are never morally acceptable options.  The task of medicine is to care even when it cannot 
cure.”  Id. at 20. 
 91. See generally About USCCB, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2020), http://www.usccb.org/about/.  For a detailed analysis of the spread of the ERDs 
in American hospital systems, see Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. 
REV. 929, 937 (2018) (documenting the phenomenon whereby “Catholic healthcare systems have 
increased in size and scope by acquiring, affiliating with, and merging with non-Catholic hospitals” 
in a multitude of “commercial transactions [that] have blurred the lines between religious and nonre-
ligious entities”).  Restrictive covenants in deeds and other legal measures can impose Catholic med-
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Further, the ERDs teach that cooperating with or supporting the immoral ac-
tions of another is as forbidden as the action itself, even on an institutional 
scale.92  Importantly, this stance has been acknowledged by the Supreme 
Court, which has held that forced complicity in an act one perceives as im-
moral creates an unconstitutional intrusion into the right of conscience.93 
As of 2010, the Catholic Church managed 26% of all healthcare facili-
ties in the world.94  In the U.S. healthcare market, where approximately 59% 
of hospitals are nonprofit, Catholic healthcare dwarfs all other religious 
healthcare providers combined, comprising four of the ten largest nonprofit 
systems.95  More than one in six acute care beds in the United States is in a 
hospital connected to the Church.96  The Catholic healthcare market has ex-
perienced steady growth for well over a century: in 1885, there were around 
150 Catholic hospitals in the United States; by 1910, there were over 400; 
and between 2001 and 2016, the number rose 22%, from 449 to 548.97  To-
day, 660 officially designated Catholic hospitals operate in the United 
States, constituting approximately 14.5% of the national market.98  These 
hospitals account for over 30% of acute care beds in five states and over 
 
ical ethics on hospitals even after all commercial relationship with the Church has ended, expanding 
the influence of the ERDs through what Professor Sepper has termed “[z]ombie religious institu-
tions.”  Id. at 931. 
 92. ERDs, supra note 89, at 25 (“Catholic health care organizations are not permitted to engage 
in immediate material cooperation in actions that are intrinsically immoral.”). 
 93. See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience 
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2533–38 (2015).  
 94. Catholic Hospitals Comprise One Quarter of World’s Healthcare, Council Reports, 
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 10, 2010), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholic_ 
hospitals_represent_26_percent_of_worlds_health_facilities_reports_pontifical_council. 
 95. Sepper, supra note 91, at 934–35; see also LOIS UTTLEY & CHRISTINE KHAIKIN, GROWTH OF 
CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS: 2016 UPDATE OF THE MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE 
REPORT, MERGER WATCH (2016),  http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/816571/27061007/ 
1465224862580/M (tracking the growth of Catholic hospitals in the United States). 
 96. Jilian Mincer, Watchdog Finds Much Larger Catholic Influence on U.S. Hospitals, REUTERS, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-hospitals-idUSKCN0XW15L (May 5, 2016). 
 97. Stephanie M. Wurdock, Doctors, Dioceses, and Decisions: Examining the Impact of the 
Catholic Hospital System and Federal Conscience Clauses on Medical Education, 6 PITT. J. ENVTL. 
L. & PUB. HEALTH L. 179, 186–87 (2012). 
 98. CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., U.S. CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE (2019), 
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/cha_2019_miniprofile.pdf? 
sfvrsn=0.  But see Sepper, supra note 91, at 970 (documenting the increasing control of the Catholic 
Church over non-Catholic hospitals, indicating the number of “unofficial[ly] Catholic” hospitals is 
even higher). 
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40% in another five states.99  In Washington, over half of the state’s acute 
care beds are in the Catholic healthcare system.100  More than half a million 
people are employed full-time by Catholic hospitals, and another quarter of a 
million part-time.101 
The bishop of the diocese where a Catholic hospital sits has “final inter-
pretive authority over compliance with the ERDs,” whose authority “also 
control[s] in the case of mergers and acquisitions between Catholic and 
secular hospitals . . . .”102  In such cases, the ERDs will often continue to 
govern the secular hospitals after they leave the Catholic system because the 
church makes the ERDs perpetual, contractual requirements.103  And as the 
percentage of doctors employed by hospitals is rapidly increasing, the num-
ber of healthcare professionals controlled by the ERDs, and therefore for-
bidden from participating in PAD, is simultaneously increasing.104 
An example of the expanding control of the Catholic Church over legal-
ized PAD arose in 2018 at the Kahala Nui retirement home in Honolulu, 
Hawaii.105  Although the home is not explicitly Catholic, it leases the land 
underneath it from the Roman Catholic Church, and the terms of that lease 
“prohibit[] the home from assisting, promoting[,] or coordinating medically 
assisted suicide . . . .”106  After notifying its residents that it would be opting 
 
 99. Sepper, supra note 91, at 935. 
 100. Danny Westneat, Is Catholic Church Taking Over Health Care in Washington?, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES (May 21, 2013), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/is-catholic-church-
taking-over-health-care-in-washington/. 
 101. Wurdock, supra note 97, at 188. 
 102. Carmella, supra note 19, at 67. 
 103. Id. at 68–9 (“In seeking to continue its moral influence over the delivery of health care even 
when no longer a direct provider, the Church makes the ERD requirements perpetual, in contracts 
and even as deed restrictions that encumber title to real property.”); see also Sepper, supra note 91 
(explaining the process in depth by which formerly Catholic hospitals are contractually bound to 
ERDs post-sale). 
 104. Updated Physician Practice Acquisition Study: National and Regional Changes in Physician 
Employment 2012–2018, PHYSICIANS ADVOC. INST., (Feb. 2019), http://www. 
physiciansadvocacyinstitute.org/Portals/0/assets/docs/021919-Avalere-PAI-Physician-Employment-
Trends-Study-2018-Update.pdf?ver=2019-02-19-162735-117.  According to a 2019 report from the 
Physicians Advocacy Institute, the number of hospital-owned practices increased by 129% between 
July 2012 and January 2018 (more than doubling the ownership percentage in just 5.5 years), with 
physician employment increasing by 70% over the same period.  Id.  This trend was consistent 
across all U.S. geographic regions.  Id. 
 105. Audrey McAvoy, Hawaii Retirement Home Clarifies Assisted Suicide Rules, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Nov. 13, 2018), https://apnews.com/f981b6d1dfe64ed4aaef0ac56c9f502f. 
 106. Id. 
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out of participation in Hawaii’s newly legalized PAD Act due to its Catholic 
lease terms, the home received a letter from the ACLU demanding it “stop 
discriminating against non-Catholic residents.”107  This conflict perfectly 
foreshadows the imminent clash between the colossal, wide-reaching Catho-
lic healthcare system and legalized PAD in a growing number of states.108 
Since the earliest PAD legalization efforts began in the United States, 
the Catholic Church has consistently expressed unwavering opposition.109  
The drafters of proposed state PAD legislation were undoubtedly aware of 
the monolithic system of anti-PAD Catholic hospitals throughout the United 
States, and two carefully worded clauses included in every state PAD bill 
may indicate a deliberate attempt to preemptively undercut the opposition: 
(1) the definition clauses, and (2) the premises clauses.110 
B. Tactical Vocabulary: If It’s Not “Suicide,” What Is It? 
The intensity of the national controversy surrounding PAD is illustrated 
by the fact that merely naming the issue elicits fierce debate among propo-
nents and critics alike.111  As with many politicized topics in modern Ameri-
 
 107. The Latest: Retirement Home Says It Doesn’t Discriminate, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 1, 
2018), https://apnews.com/7e59dce0d8944583abcce5d3e4f42e08. 
 108. See Sepper, supra note 91, at 963–68 (discussing the distinct role that religious institutions, 
including the Catholic Church, play in the social order due to their size and reach). 
 109. See Lindsay Reynolds, Note, Losing the Quality of Life: The Move Toward Society’s Under-
standing and Acceptance of Physician Aid-in-Dying and the Death with Dignity Act, 48 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 343, 344 (2014) (arguing that “the Death with Dignity Act’s (DWDA) nemesis is religion” 
and that “[r]eligious affiliates abuse their power—trampling on an individual’s right to determine 
their future—thus extinguishing any hope of enacting the DWDA”); see also Tucker, supra note 53, 
at 123 (“The [Catholic Church] has been the largest single contributor opposing aid in dying legisla-
tion.”).  Professor Tucker has documented Catholic donations to anti-PAD efforts in state referenda: 
“$777,782 (53.74% of the opponents’ budget) in Washington State in 2008; $1,288,894 (73.9%) in 
Maine in 2000; $2,173,330 (38.0%) in Michigan in 1998; $1,677,699 (73.6%) in the 1997 Oregon 
campaign.”  Id. at 123 n.54. 
 110. See infra Sections III.B and III.C, respectively. 
 111. See Thurston, supra note 37, at 33–35; see also Kathryn L. Tucker & Fred B. Steele, Patient 
Choice at the End of Life: Getting the Language Right, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 305–25 (2007); Terminol-
ogy of Assisted Dying, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NATIONAL CENTER, https://www.deathwithdignity. 
org/terminology/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2020) (advising readers to refrain from using the term “sui-
cide” in describing PAD and recommending alternate “value-neutral” terminology); Medical Aid in 
Dying is not Assisted Suicide, Suicide or Euthanasia, COMPASSION & CHOICES, 
https://compassionandchoices.org/about-us/medical-aid-dying-not-assisted-suicide/ (last visited Oct. 
29, 2020) (explaining how “medical aid-in-dying” is “fundamentally different” than suicide or eu-
thanasia). 
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can culture, the language identifying the issues is tactically formulated to 
nudge the listener toward a certain emotional stance.112  Concerning PAD, 
the semantic debate hinges on whether to use the word “suicide” when de-
scribing the practice.113  Although proponents of PAD argue that using the 
word “suicide” offends patients and perpetuates a negative connotation to-
ward the procedure, they also have a significant, practical interest in avoid-
ing the word: polling support for PAD drops when the word “suicide” is in-
cluded in the question and rises when the word is removed.114 
All nine of the statutes legalizing PAD include a strict directive for de-
scribing the patient’s death: “Actions taken in accordance with this [Act] do 
not, for any purpose, constitute suicide [or] assisted suicide . . . .”115  The 
Washington PAD Act and the Maine PAD Act further limit the permissible 
language, stipulating that “state reports” cannot refer to the patient’s cause 
of death as “suicide” or “assisted suicide,” restricting them instead to more 
oblique phraseology: “[o]btaining and self-administering life-ending medi-
cation.”116  And going even further to distance the practice from the word 
“suicide,” the PAD Acts from Washington, Colorado, Washington, D.C., 
and Hawaii mandate that the patient’s death certificate “shall list the [pa-
tient’s] underlying terminal disease as the cause of death”—despite the fact 
that the entire premise of PAD is that the patient willfully takes their own 
life instead of the underlying terminal disease.117 
 
 112. See, e.g., Verbal Engineering, PATIENTS RIGHTS COUNCIL (2013), http://www. 
patientsrightscouncil.org/site/verbal-engineering/ (noting that “[a]ll social engineering is preceded 
by verbal engineering” and collecting articles documenting the “[w]ords [and] platitudes used by 
advocates of euthanasia [and] doctor-prescribed suicide”). 
 113. Katy Butler, Aid in Dying or Assisted Suicide? What to Do When Every Phrase Is Fraught, 
CTR. FOR HEALTH JOURNALISM (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.centerforhealthjournalism.org/ 
2015/10/23/aid-dying-or-assisted-suicide-what-do-when-neutral-terms-can%e2%80%99t-be-found. 
 114. Lydia Saad, U.S. Support for Euthanasia Hinges on How It’s Described, GALLUP (May 29, 
2013), https://news.gallup.com/poll/162815/support-euthanasia-hinges-described.aspx (“Americans 
generally favor allowing doctors to assist terminally ill patients in ending their lives, but the degree 
of support ranges from 51% to 70%, depending on how the process is described.”). 
 115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-121 (2016).  This quote is from the Colorado PAD Act, but all 
nine Acts contain virtually identical orders.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5292 (2013) (“Action 
taken in accordance with this chapter shall not be construed for any purpose to constitute suicide [or] 
assisted suicide.”). 
 116. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.180(1) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140(20) (2019). 
 117. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.040(2) (2009).  This quote is from the Washington PAD Act, but 
the others are virtually identical.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-1(2) (2016).  Washington, 
D.C.’s PAD Act adds that the underlying illness must be listed as the patient’s cause of death “with-
out reference to the fact that the qualified patient ingested a covered medication.”  D.C. Code § 7–
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“Suicide,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, “is the willful and 
voluntary act of a person who understands the physical nature of the act, and 
intends by it to accomplish the result of self-destruction,” or “the deliberate 
termination of one’s existence, while in the possession and enjoyment of his 
mental faculties.”118  Unquestionably, PAD exemplifies suicide under this 
definition: PAD is the voluntary self-destruction of a fully aware patient.119  
This renders the statutory insistence on avoiding the obviously applicable 
term (“suicide”) puzzling at first glance.120 
This preemptive eradication of all references to “suicide” lays the 
groundwork for the invasion of religious liberty posed by PAD, because the 
specific wording of the ERDs issued by the Catholic Church bans Catholic 
doctors and hospitals from participating in, literally, “assisted suicide.”121  
By performing a semantic sidestep, all nine state statutes legalizing PAD 
have rendered the practice ostensibly compliant with the Catholic ERDs: 
How can a doctor offering PAD be performing an “assisted suicide” if the 
state statute has pointedly defined PAD as “not assisted suicide”?122 
The notion that such linguistic hairsplitting contributed to the careful 
“non-suicide” verbiage in every American PAD statute is supported by the 
fact that the argument has already been offered with a straight face in Ma-
honey v. Centura Health Corporation.123  Dr. Barbara Morris, represented by 
(among others) the End of Life Liberty Project,124 brought this Colorado 
 
661.05(h) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 118. Suicide, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 11th ed. (2019). 
 119. See supra text accompanying note 38.  Indeed, each state PAD Act unequivocally mandates 
the characteristics and faculties of a patient eligible for PAD, which follow Black’s definition of 
“suicide” to the letter: the patient must act voluntarily, understand the consequences of the act, in-
tend to terminate his own existence, and possess all mental abilities at the time.  See supra text ac-
companying note 38. 
 120. See Susan Gilbert, Physician Aid in Dying? Euthanasia? Getting the Terminology Straight, 
CTR. FOR HEALTH JOURNALISM (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.centerforhealthjournalism. 
org/2015/09/15/physician-aid-dying-euthanasia-getting-terminology-straight. 
 121. See ERDs, supra note 89. 
 122. If the court validates this euphemistic dodge, would it then apply consistent logic to validate 
a statute permitting doctors to perform “fetal terminations” in Catholic hospitals, since the ERDs 
only prohibit “abortion”?  See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 50 (Secker & Warburg 
1949) (“Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought?  In the end 
we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express 
it. . . .  The Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect.”). 
 123. Complaint, Mahoney et al. v. Centura Health Corporation, 2019-cv-31980 (2019) [hereinaf-
ter “Centura Complaint”]. 
 124. End of Life Liberty Project, CASCADIANOW!, https://www.cascadianow.org/end-of-life-
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case against the Catholic healthcare group Centura Health Corporation for 
firing Dr. Morris after she tried to offer PAD to a patient in violation of her 
contract with the hospital.125  A September 2019 press release from Morris’s 
counsel captures the semantic sidestep argument: “Centura fired Dr. Morris 
because she violated [the ERDs] . . . [which] state that Catholic health care 
institutions may not ‘participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide.’  But as the 
[Colorado PAD] Act makes clear, medical aid-in-dying is not euthanasia or 
assisted suicide.”126 
The case has not yet been decided, and whether courts will recognize a 
legal difference between “medical aid-in-dying” and “assisted suicide” re-
mains to be seen.127  Either way, the effects of such a decision will be far-
reaching: nearly one-third of Colorado’s hospitals have asserted their refusal 
to offer PAD since legalization in 2016.128 
C. The “Premises Loophole” 
Every state law permitting PAD contains a clause purportedly classify-
ing all participation in any PAD-related services for both physicians and 
healthcare institutions as entirely voluntary.129  Additionally, each law per-
mits “a health care provider [to] prohibit another health care provider from 
 
liberty-project (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).  This organization was founded and is currently directed 
by career-PAD-advocate Professor Kathryn L. Tucker, who argued in favor of PAD before the Su-
preme Court in Glucksberg when she was head of Compassion & Choices in 1997.  Id. 
 125. Colorado Doctor Challenges Firing by Centura Health over Aid in Dying, THE DENVER 
POST (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/10/09/colorado-centura-health-assisted-
suicide-lawsuit/. 
 126. FGMC Attorneys Represent Doctor and Patient in Landmark Medical Aid-in-Dying Case, 
FOSTER GRAHAM MILSTEIN & CALISHER, LLP (Sept. 3, 2019) [hereinafter FGMC], 
https://fostergraham.com/2019/09/fgmc-attorneys-represent-doctor-and-patient-in-medical-aid-in-
dying-case/ (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Judith Graham, Colorado’s Aid in Dying Law in Disarray as Big Catholic Health Systems 
Opt Out, STAT NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/19/aid-in-dying-catholic-
hospitals-colorado/ (adding that “two of the state’s biggest health care systems, both faith-based, 
appear poised to bar their doctors from providing [PAD] to patients at any of their facilities, under 
any circumstances”). 
 129. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 127.885 § 4.01(2) (1994): “No professional organization or associ-
ation, or health care provider, may subject a person to censure, discipline, suspension, loss of li-
cense, loss of privileges, loss of membership or other penalty for participating or refusing to partici-
pate in good faith compliance with [this Act].”  Every state statute permitting PAD contains a similar 
“voluntary” provision for both physicians and healthcare providers.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 70.245.190(1)(b) (2008). 
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participating in [the state’s PAD Act] on the premises of the prohibiting pro-
vider. . . .”130  This “premises clause” creates an immense limitation on the 
ability of healthcare institutions to control whether or not their employees 
will offer PAD to their patients, regardless of any conscience objections 
from the employing hospital.131  If, for example, a doctor wishes to prescribe 
death-inducing medication to a terminal patient, and the hospital employing 
that doctor expresses a conscientious objection to PAD, the hospital is nev-
ertheless rendered legally powerless to stop the doctor from prescribing the 
medication—so long as the patient leaves the hospital premises before in-
gesting it.132  While pro-PAD activists may view the premises loophole as a 
victory for patients, this suspicious technicality enables the lawful violation 
of conscience rights and forces healthcare institutions to provide services in-
consistent with their moral principles.133 
The magnitude of this loophole is illustrated by the fact that, in 2018, an 
overwhelming majority of patients utilizing legal PAD did so at home, rather 
than on the premises of a hospital: 92% in California,134 85.6% in Colora-
do,135 87.5% in Oregon,136 and 86% in Washington.137  These statistics sup-
 
 130. OR. REV. STAT. 127.885 § 4.01(5)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).  This quote is from the Ore-
gon DWDA, but each state statute contains a nearly identical “premises clause,” allowing hospitals 
to prohibit healthcare providers from administering PAD only at the specific site of the physical hos-
pital.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 113.5286 (2013). 
 131. See infra text accompanying notes 142–144. 
 132. See infra text accompanying notes 142–144.  For example, if the Kahala Nui retirement 
home in Honolulu succeeded in implementing the ERDs, thereby preventing its facilities and 
healthcare workers from promoting or practicing PAD, the home would still be incapable of prevent-
ing any of its workers from giving death-inducing medication to every single resident who requested 
it and qualified for it under Hawaii law, so long as those residents crossed the property line to exit 
the “premises” before taking that medication.  See supra notes 105–108 (describing the dilemma 
forced upon the Kahala Nui retirement home by Hawaii’s PAD act). 
 133. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obliga-
tions in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 58 (1994) (“As 
patient autonomy receives more and more legal sanction, the problem of preserving the physician’s 
moral integrity will grow.  This danger is accentuated by the deficiency of ‘conscience clauses,’ 
which could provide statutory protection for physicians who refuse to provide or participate in pro-
cedures they find repugnant on moral or religious grounds.”). 
 134. California End of Life Option Act 2018 Data Report, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH 1, 6, 9 
(July 2019), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHSI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/CDPH%20 
End%20of%20Life%20Option%20Act%20Report%202018-FINAL.pdf. 
 135. Colorado End-of-Life Options Act, Year Three 2019 Data Summary with 2017–2019 Trends 
and Totals, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T 1, 5 (2019), https://drive.google.com/ 
file/d/1FmoyCcL2gHopDO9rCJ2lGFEMUye8FQei/view. 
 136. Oregon Death with Dignity Act 2018 Data Summary, PUB. HEALTH DIVISION, CTR. FOR 
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port the common claim from PAD activists that one of the central benefits of 
PAD is the patient’s ability to choose the time and location of his or her 
death; understandably, most terminal patients choose to die in their own 
homes rather than on the premises of a hospital.138  The fact that PAD nearly 
always takes place at the patient’s home demonstrates that every PAD law’s 
“premises clause” renders its institutional conscience protections functional-
ly ineffective at best, and ominously duplicitous at worst.139 
The “premises clause” issue was raised against the Catholic healthcare 
system in Mahoney, the case unfolding in Colorado, with Dr. Morris citing 
Colorado’s premises clause in defense of her decision to offer PAD to her 
patient in violation of her employer’s religious beliefs.140  Specifically, she 
argued, “[t]he Act contains an ‘opt-out’ provision that permits hospitals to 
prohibit their physicians from prescribing aid-in-dying medication to pa-
tients who intend to use the medication on hospital premises.  The Act does 
not allow hospitals to opt out of the Act altogether.”141  Centura acknowl-
edged its policy “conflicts with Colorado law,” but maintained that the poli-
cy was “nevertheless required by [its] religious beliefs”—perfectly capturing 
the unethical dilemma forced upon conscientious healthcare institutions by 
premises clauses.142  Absent constitutional protection, the premises clause in 
 
HEALTH STAT. 1, 6 (last updated April 25, 2019), www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/providerpartnerresources/ 
evaluationresearch/deathwithdignityact/Documents/year21.pdf. 
 137. 2018 Death with Dignity Act Report, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH 1, 13 (July 2019), 
https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/422-109-DeathWithDignityAct2018.pdf. 
 138. See Tucker, supra note 53, at 120 (“The availability of the option of aid in dying gives the 
terminally ill autonomy, control and choice, the overwhelming motivational factor behind the deci-
sion to request assistance in dying.”). 
 139. See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 
(2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (denying to hear case about a family-owned pharmacy ordered to stock 
and sell contraceptives in violation of religious beliefs).  Dissenting against denial of certiorari, Jus-
tice Alito labeled the case “an ominous sign” and warned that “[i]f this is a sign of how religious 
liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who value religious freedom have cause for 
great concern.”  Stormans, 136 S. Ct. at 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting).  In a description directly analo-
gous to Catholic hospitals like Centura that object to PAD under new state PAD laws, Justice Alito 
captured the conscientious pharmacists’ plight: “The dilemma . . . is plain: Violate your sincerely 
held religious beliefs or get out of the pharmacy business.”  Id. at 2434; see also Pellegrino, supra 
note 6, at 233–34 (“One can foresee the day when patients may gain legal rights to demand a full 
range of death ‘services’ from every licensed physician . . . .  If universal health-care were to be in-
stituted and ‘death care,’ as well as birth and reproductive care, were to be entitlements, would 
Catholic physicians be given only limited practice licenses?”). 
 140. Centura Complaint, supra note 123, at 11–12. 
 141. FGMC, supra note 126. 
 142. Id. 
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Colorado’s PAD Act would force Centura to violate its institutional con-
science and religious directives by allowing a doctor it employs to give a pa-
tient being treated on its premises medicine to end his own life—provided 
the patient simply leaves the hospital premises before ingesting the medi-
cine.  This is a violation of Centura’s constitutional right to freely exercise 
its religious beliefs, and every Catholic hospital in a state with legal PAD 
faces the same threat from its own state’s premises clause.143 
IV. MEDICAL MINISTERS: FORTIFYING THE INSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
CONSCIENCE IN HEALTHCARE 
A well-coordinated, pro-PAD army of activist groups, donors, and lob-
byists is overhauling historic anti-PAD public opinion and laying siege to 
state governments through lawsuits, ballot initiatives, and an unrelenting on-
slaught of PAD-legalization bills, and this effort will continue to accelerate 
in the coming decades.144  The threat to religious liberty posed by this social 
upheaval is clear and imminent, and has already manifested in at least one 
foreboding case, Mahoney v. Centura.145  Religious liberty advocacy is often 
reactive in nature, addressing threats and grievances as they arise rather than 
legislating preemptively, in part because the next antireligious legal attack 
can be difficult to predict.146  In the case of PAD, the opposite is true: the 
 
 143. See Pellegrino, supra note 6, at 236 (“Catholic hospitals can properly be considered to have a 
definable institutional ‘conscience,’ one, which given the content of the Catholic moral tradition, 
could and does come into conflict with secular society and its ‘values.’”). 
 144. See generally Attempts to Legalize Euthanasia/Assisted-Suicide in the United States, supra 
note 58 (presenting a brief history of the assisted suicide movement). 
[S]ince Oregon legalized assisted suicide in 1994, many states have rejected assisted-
suicide measures, some multiple times.  Between January 1994 [and] February 2020, 
there have been 284 proposals in more than 43 states and the District of Columbia.  Yet, 
over and over again, bills were either defeated, tabled for the session, withdrawn by 
sponsors, or languished with no action taken. 
Id. 
 145. See Centura Complaint, supra note 123. 
 146. See LUKE W. GOODRICH, FREE TO BELIEVE: THE BATTLE OVER RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN 
AMERICA 182 (2019).  Goodrich notes another reason for the generally reactive nature of religious 
liberty: victory for Christians is not about securing favorable court decisions and laws, but about 
living a certain kind of life.  Id.  After recounting his numerous experiences advocating for religious 
liberty in American courts, Goodrich pauses to explain this concept: 
[S]tarting with a strategy for “winning” is the wrong way to approach the question.  It as-
sumes the primary goal in religious freedom conflicts is to “win,” and it’s often driven by 
fear—fear that our rights will be taken away or other bad things will happen if we lose.  
That fear, in turn, produces anger, hostility, frustration, and despair.  Scripture, however, 
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battle lines are drawn, the clash is inevitable, and the stakes are literally life-
or-death.  Accordingly, religious hospitals can and should apply the broad 
latitude afforded to religious employers by the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission to terminate healthcare workers who fail to 
personify the hospital’s conscientious beliefs.147 
A. What Is a “Minister”? 
The judge-created “ministerial exception”—a legal doctrine rooted in 
both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, which guarantees religious 
institutions the right to hire employees who represent and personify their be-
liefs free from government oversight—is well-established but poorly 
named.148  Judicial recognition of this right, as well as its misleading moni-
ker, originated in the Fourth Circuit in 1985.149  In the same sentence where 
 
calls us to a radically different approach.  We’re not called to win but to be like Jesus; not 
to fear suffering but to fear God; not to be surprised at hostility but to expect it; not to 
complain when we lose but to rejoice; not to lash out at our opponents but to love them.  
We’re called not to avoid losing at all costs but to glorify God at all costs. 
Id. 
 147. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012) (recognizing “a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment,” which guarantees religious institutions the right to hire employees who repre-
sent and personify their beliefs); see also infra Sections IV.A.–B.  Hosanna-Tabor effectively rein-
terpreted the landmark case of Employment Division v. Smith, which had drastically narrowed the 
scope and redefined the parameters of religious freedom.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free 
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1990); Douglas Lay-
cock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. L. REV. 1 (1990).  For a discussion of the inter-
relation between Smith, Hosanna-Tabor, and PAD, see infra Section IV.C. 
 148. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (recognizing “a ministerial exception grounded in the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment”); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. 
Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020) (“The rule appears to have acquired the label ‘ministerial exception’ because 
the individuals involved in pioneering cases were described as ‘ministers.’”); see also Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Hosanna in the Highest!, PUB. DISCOURSE (Jan. 13, 2012), https://www. 
thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/01/4541/ (“The ‘ministerial exception’ label really ought to be dis-
carded, for it is now something of a misnomer, a relic of the pre-Hosanna-Tabor, lower court-
developed doctrinal approach.  Rather, the right should be understood as the ‘religious autonomy 
right’—an ‘exception’ to nothing but a principle of its own.”). 
 149. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 
1985) (applying “[t]he ‘ministerial exception’ to Title VII first articulated in [McClure]” to the case 
of a female applying to work on a church pastoral staff) (citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 
F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972)).  McClure articulated the doctrine in a case 
dealing with “the church-minister relationship,” but Rayburn first bestowed the inarticulate title.  
McClure, 460 F.2d at 555. 
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it established the now-famous phrase “ministerial exception,” the court im-
mediately qualified its language by broadening it substantially: the exception 
“does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the position.”150  
In other words, from the moment of its judicial inception, the “ministerial 
exception” has been more than just an exception and applied to more than 
just ministers; rather, it is an affirmative right guaranteed to any religious 
institution with employees who represent or personify its beliefs based on 
their function, not their title.151  As other courts of appeals began readily ap-
plying this right across the country, the name, regrettably, stuck.152  Concep-
tually, however, the breadth of the ministerial exception continued to exceed 
the nominal borders suggested by its name, with circuit courts identifying 
sufficient ministerial function in non-ordained seminary professors153 and 
hospital chaplains.154 
Finally, in 2012, the ministerial exception came before the Supreme 
Court in a landmark case concerning a narcoleptic kindergarten teacher at a 
Lutheran school in Michigan: Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.155  After Cheryl Perich left 
her teaching job on disability and came back to find her position had been 
given away, she “violated the [Lutheran] Synod’s belief that Christians 
should resolve their disputes internally” by threatening to sue the Church.156  
The school terminated her for this act of “insubordination,” and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act for unlawful dismissal.157  The district court granted 
summary judgment for Hosanna-Tabor, which claimed the ministerial ex-
ception permitted its dismissal of Perich.158  The Sixth Circuit vacated and 
 
 150. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168 (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Sw. Baptist Semi-
nary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982)). 
 151. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 n.2 (2012) (noting that “the Courts of Appeals have 
uniformly recognized the existence of a ‘ministerial exception’” and documenting federal courts of 
appeals cases). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d at 283–84. 
 154. See Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir. 
1991); see also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (“Every Court of Appeals to have considered the 
question has concluded that the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congre-
gation, and we agree.”). 
 155. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
 156. Id. at 180. 
 157. Id. at 179–80. 
 158. Id. at 180–81. 
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remanded, recognizing the ministerial exception’s First Amendment justifi-
cation but finding that Perich did not qualify as a “minister,” and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.159 
Confronted with an issue involving the ministerial exception for the first 
time in its history, the Supreme Court unflinchingly affirmed, enforced, and 
expanded it—unanimously.160  Writing for the entire Court, Chief Justice 
Roberts declared that “[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted 
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so . . . interferes with the in-
ternal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the se-
lection of those who will personify its beliefs.”161  Having validated the min-
isterial exception’s constitutionality, the Court next explored whether Perich 
qualified as a minister under this broad, new definition: personifying be-
liefs.162  Ruling that she was indeed a minister, the Court listed the details it 
found convincing, including her formal title, her religious training, the fact 
that she held a distinct role from other members, and the fact that her “job 
duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out 
its mission.”163  Although it thus categorized Perich as a minister, the Court 
concluded with a critical caveat: “We are reluctant . . . to adopt a rigid for-
mula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.  It is enough for 
us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that 
the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employ-
ment.”164 
By declining “to adopt a rigid formula,” the Court instead offered a 
standard that outlines the broadest workable definition for a “minister”: an 
employee of a religious institution who “personif[ies] its beliefs.”165  Chief 
 
 159. Id. at 181. 
 160. Id. at 175, 181. 
 161. Id. at 188 (emphasis added); see also Laycock, supra note 8, at 1389 (arguing that institu-
tional free exercise includes the right of churches to autonomously “select their own leaders, define 
their own doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions,” and noting that reli-
gious believers “exercise their religion through religious organizations, and these organizations must 
be protected by the [Free Exercise] clause”) (footnotes omitted). 
 162. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–90. 
 163. Id. at 191–92. 
 164. Id. at 190. 
 165. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188, 190; see also Paulsen, supra note 148 (“The Court’s one-
word descriptor perhaps says it best: [‘ministers’ are] those persons that the community identifies as 
personifying its religious identity.  The Court decided only the case before it, but it made clear that 
the right itself is one of religious community autonomy, broadly understood. It is not a right limited 
to pastors alone.”). 
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Justice Roberts seemed to affirm the standard’s wide-ranging scope when he 
wrote that the ministerial exception affects “the interest of religious groups 
in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out 
their mission.”166  The inclusion of this final category of individuals, which 
surely also includes those who “personify” the beliefs of the religious insti-
tution, captures the significant interpretive expansion the Supreme Court 
implemented to ministerial exception jurisprudence in Hosanna-Tabor.167 
Within nine months, the Fifth Circuit applied the language of Hosanna-
Tabor to identify Philip Cannata, a church’s music director, as a minister in 
a wrongful termination case against a Catholic church in Austin, Texas.168  
Unlike Perich in Hosanna-Tabor, Cannata had no formal title indicating his 
role as minister, no teaching responsibilities whatsoever, and no theological 
or ecumenical training.169  After quoting the “personifying beliefs” language 
from Hosanna-Tabor, the court reasoned that 
[a]pplication of the [ministerial] exception . . . does not depend on a 
finding that Cannata satisfies the same considerations [as Perich].  
Rather, it is enough to note that there is no genuine dispute that 
Cannata played an integral role in the celebration of Mass and that 
by playing the piano during services, Cannata furthered the mission 
of the church and helped convey its message to the congregants.170 
The factual considerations the Supreme Court noted in declaring Perich a 
minister were all absent when the Fifth Circuit declared Cannata a minister, 
underscoring the common trait between the two: personifying belief.171 
 
 166. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. at 188–89. 
 168. Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 169. Id. at 171.  Cannata argued “that he merely played the piano at Mass and that his only re-
sponsibilities were keeping the books, running the sound system, and doing custodial work, none of 
which was religious in nature.”  Id. at 177.  Cannata was given no “liturgical responsibilities” be-
cause he “lacked the requisite education, training, and experience.”  Id. at 171. 
 170. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).  Here, the Fifth Circuit echoed the Supreme Court in Hosanna-
Tabor, which rejected the EEOC’s argument that “any ministerial exception ‘should be limited to 
those employees who perform exclusively religious functions,’” declaring: “We cannot accept that 
view.  Indeed, we are unsure whether any such employees exist.”  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193 
(quoting Brief for the Federal Respondent at 51, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10–533)). 
 171. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188; Cannata, 700 F.3d at 173, 177. 
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In 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed the “personifying belief” standard 
as the backbone of the ministerial exception in its second case addressing the 
doctrine, Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.172  Agnes Mor-
rissey-Berru, a teacher at a Catholic elementary school, alleged the school 
declined to renew her contract in order to replace her with a younger teacher 
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.173  The case was 
consolidated with St. James School v. Biel, which also involved a teacher at 
a Catholic elementary school alleging her contract was not renewed due to 
employment discrimination.174  The Court ruled, 7–2, that both suits were 
barred by the ministerial exception.175  Writing for the majority, Justice Alito 
first noted that neither teacher was “given the title of ‘minister’” by her re-
spective employer, and that both teachers had “less religious training than 
[Cheryl] Perich,” the teacher the Court affirmed as a minister in Hosanna-
Tabor.176  Though the Court had recognized various factors in concluding 
that Perich qualified as a minister, that recognition “did not mean that [those 
factors] must be met—or even that they are necessarily important—in all 
other cases.”177  “What matters, at bottom,” Justice Alito stressed, “is what 
an employee does.”178  
The Court’s endorsement of functionality led Justice Sotomayor, in her 
dissent, to accuse the Court of “rewriting Hosanna-Tabor.”179  Factors like 
titles and training, she argued, were critical to Hosanna-Tabor’s definition 
of “minister” because they served to “separate leaders who ‘personify’ a 
church’s ‘beliefs’” from those who merely “relay religious tenets.”180  Jus-
tice Alito responded that this characterization of Hosanna-Tabor was incor-
rect—employees who only “relay religious tenets” could certainly be minis-
ters, the exception was never limited to “leaders,” and such an “unworkable 
 
 172. 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020). 
 173. Id. at 2056–58. 
 174. 140 S. Ct. 680 (2020) (mem.); Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2058–59.  Biel alleged 
her contract was not renewed because she requested a leave of absence to receive cancer treatment, 
but the school maintained that its decision was based on her “poor performance” as a teacher.  Our 
Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2059. 
 175. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2055. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 2063.  Specifically, the Court identified formal titles and academic training as “circum-
stances [which], while instructive in Hosanna-Tabor, are not inflexible requirements and may have 
far less significance in some cases.”  Id. at 2064. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 2075 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. 
[Vol. 48: 175, 2021] The Right to Conscience vs. The Right to Die 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
209 
test” was never contemplated by the Court in Hosanna-Tabor.181  Justice So-
tomayor’s dissent further charged that, because neither school “required its 
religion teachers to be Catholic,” the schools could not show how “a non-
Catholic ‘personif[ies]’ Catholicism.”182  The majority, however, declined to 
“delve into the sensitive question of what it means to be a ‘practicing’ mem-
ber of a faith,” and rejected Morrissey-Berru’s argument that she could not 
be a Catholic minister because she was not “a practicing Catholic.”183  
Though the Court ultimately echoed Hosanna-Tabor in declining to adopt a 
“rigid formula” to define ministers, Our Lady of Guadalupe clarified that an 
employee’s ministerial status does not depend on any of the Hosanna-Tabor 
“factors,” and does not require the employee to adhere to the religion of their 
employer.184  The true extent of the ministerial exception, however, has not 
yet been defined. 
B. Healthcare Workers at Catholic Hospitals Are “Ministers” Under 
Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe 
1. Healthcare Workers at Catholic Hospitals Personify Catholic 
Beliefs 
From its beginning, for almost two millennia, the Catholic Church has 
sought to imitate its founding figure, Jesus Christ, by embodying perhaps his 
most famous and widely celebrated characteristic: healing the sick.185  Cath-
olic missionaries have a well-documented history of spreading healthcare 
across the globe in their evangelization efforts, and the Catholic emphasis on 
healthcare as both spiritual outreach and as spiritual mission continues today 
 
 181. Id. at 2067 n.26 (majority opinion). 
 182. Id. at 2081 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id. at 2069 (majority opinion). 
 184. Id. (“[W]e declined to adopt a ‘rigid formula’ in Hosanna-Tabor, and the lower courts have 
been applying the exception for many years without such a formula.  Here, as in Hosanna-Tabor, it 
is sufficient to decide the case before us.”). 
 185. See, e.g., John 9; Luke 17; Mark 5; Matthew 8.  Jesus also charged his followers to heal the 
sick as he had done and promised that they would have power over disease.  Luke 10:9; Matthew 
10:8; see also ERDs, supra note 89, at 6 (“The mystery of Christ casts light on every facet of Catho-
lic health care: to see Christian love as the animating principle of health care; to see healing and 
compassion as a continuation of Christ’s mission; to see suffering as a participation in the redemp-
tive power of Christ’s passion, death, and resurrection; and to see death, transformed by the resurrec-
tion, as an opportunity for a final act of communion with Christ.”). 
[Vol. 48: 175, 2021] The Right to Conscience vs. The Right to Die 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
210 
in the United States.186  The preeminent Catholic authority on healthcare 
practices, the ERDs, summarize this core commitment and call for steadfast-
ness in the face of modern moral turbulence: “Now, with American health 
care facing even more dramatic changes, we reaffirm the Church’s commit-
ment to health care ministry and the distinctive Catholic identity of the 
Church’s institutional health care services.”187  Unambiguously, the ERDs 
uphold the healthcare arm of Catholic ministry (“the ecclesial mission of 
healthcare”) as being at the very heart of the Church’s identity.188  Conse-
quentially, the ERDs take care to identify the parties who will carry out, or 
personify, this core belief: institutional Catholic healthcare systems, includ-
ing “the sponsors, trustees, administrators, chaplains, physicians, health care 
personnel, and patients or residents of these institutions and services.”189  
These healthcare workers are the sole representatives of their Catholic em-
ployers’ spiritual commitment to healing the sick, and are thus the only pos-
sible means by which these religious institutions may carry out this tenet of 
 
 186. See ERDs, supra note 89, at 8 (explaining that the motivating factor leading “institutionally 
based Catholic health care services in the United States to become an integral part of the nation’s 
health care system” is “[t]heir embrace of Christ’s healing mission”).   
 187. Id. at 4. 
 188. Id.; see, e.g., A Shared Statement of Identity, CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., 
https://www.chausa.org/mission/a-shared-statement-of-identity (last visited Oct. 29, 2020) (“We are 
the people of Catholic health care, a ministry of the church continuing Jesus’ mission of love and 
healing today.  As provider, employer, advocate, citizen—bringing together people of diverse faiths 
and backgrounds—our ministry is an enduring sign of health care rooted in our belief that every per-
son is a treasure, every life a sacred gift, every human being a unity of body, mind, and spirit.”). 
 189. ERDs, supra note 89, at 4; see also Health and Health Care: A Pastoral Letter of the Ameri-
can Catholic Bishops, U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS 15 (1981), 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/health-and-
health-care-pastoral-letter-pdf-09-01-43.pdf (“By its very nature a Catholic health care facility aims 
to take on the character of a Christian community.  All who work there are participants in the Catho-
lic health apostolate.  Catholic institutions are encouraged to provide education and training pro-
grams to instruct and inform their employees in the Catholic philosophy of care of the sick.”).  Cath-
olic healthcare institutions may soon have to include pharmacists in the explicit list of healthcare 
workers who carry out their medical mission and thus require protection from evolving secular 
norms: although the 2019 Our Care, Our Choice Act gives Hawaii doctors the right to opt out of per-
forming PAD, in January 2019, the Hawaii legislature introduced a bill to “[e]stablish penalties for 
pharmacies and pharmacists who refuse to honor and fill a prescription for any qualifying patient.”  
S.B. 542, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019).  For conscientious pharmacists who object to PAD, as 
well as for conscientious pharmacies exercising their institutional free exercise right to prohibit their 
employees from participating in PAD, this bill represents a creative, new attack on medical con-
science in pharmacies, analogous to the attack currently unfolding against conscientious hospitals.  
See generally Hawaii, PATIENTS RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/hawaii/ 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2020) (tracking current and proposed legislation regarding PAD). 
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their faith.190  In short, when it comes to the Catholic Church’s sincerely held 
and centuries-old religious commitment to healing the sick, its healthcare 
employees necessarily personify its beliefs—they are “ministers.”191 
2. Catholic Healthcare Institutions Must Have the Final Say in 
Identifying Their Ministers 
Justice Thomas and Justice Alito (joined by Justice Kagan) authored 
two concurring opinions alongside Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the 
Court in Hosanna-Tabor.192  Remarkably, these concurrences each contend 
that the Constitution requires the definition of “minister” to be expanded 
even further, to allow the religious institutions to identify and define for 
themselves which of their employees qualify as ministers.193 
According to Justice Thomas, the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses 
require courts to “defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understand-
ing of who qualifies as its minister.”194  Justice Thomas argued that the min-
 
 190. See generally Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surpris-
ing Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1649–63 (detailing the decades-long journey of the 
ministerial exception through the circuit courts, documenting the various expansions of the role of 
“minister,” and noting that “[n]o court has limited the ministerial exception to ordained clergy” and 
that it “covers all employees with ministerial functions”). 
 191. See Myers, supra note 36, at 24 (capturing the incongruity of current conscience law: 
“[R]eligion only receives protection in areas such as religious belief and worship.  But when religion 
is out in the world, running schools or hospitals or homeless shelters, it must be treated just like any 
other entity.”).  If religion only receives legal protection in designated ecumenical spaces during 
formal worship services, “there is no way religious entities can be faithful to their religious identities 
when they venture out into the public realm; these entities must be subject to the demands of the 
secular state.”  Id.  In the same way, the law undermines religion when it defines ministers with the 
same restrictive formality: Must one personify all of Jesus’ commands to his disciples before one 
can be classified as a minister, including “heal[ing] the sick, rais[ing] the dead, cleans[ing] lepers, 
[and] cast[ing] out demons”?  Matthew 10:8.  Under such a framework, even the canonized, world-
renowned Saint Mother Theresa cannot qualify as a “minister,” because she healed the sick and 
cleansed lepers, but failed to carry out Jesus’ command to raise the dead.  Mother Theresa Biograph-
ical, THE NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1979/teresa/biographical/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2020).  Healthcare workers employed by the Catholic Church for the explicit purpose of 
carrying out its ministry to heal the sick need not simultaneously personify every potential arm of 
global Catholic ministry—they personify one ministry (healing the sick), and are, consequently, 
ministers.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 192. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
565 U.S. 171, 196–206 (2012). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (“[I]t is a significant burden on 
[Vol. 48: 175, 2021] The Right to Conscience vs. The Right to Die 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
212 
isterial exception would be rendered “hollow . . . if secular courts could sec-
ond-guess the organization’s sincere determination that a given employee is 
a ‘minister’ under the organization’s theological tenets.”195  Using Perich as 
an example, Justice Thomas agreed that the facts of her case “amply demon-
strate[d] [her] ministerial role,” but maintained that far less would have been 
dispositive: “[T]he evidence demonstrat[ing] that Hosanna-Tabor sincerely 
considered Perich a minister . . . would be sufficient for me to conclude that 
Perich’s suit is properly barred.”196  Like Chief Justice Roberts in the majori-
ty opinion, Justice Thomas rejected “a bright-line test or multifactor analy-
sis,” reasoning that different definitions between religious groups may “vary 
widely” and that such a rigid test “risk[s] disadvantaging those religious 
groups whose beliefs, practices, and membership are outside of the ‘main-
stream’ or unpalatable to some.”197 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, wrote separately to emphasize 
the majority’s determination that employees’ functions, rather than their 
formal titles or ordination statuses, identify them as ministers.198  Because 
the literal word “minister” is used most commonly by Protestant Christians 
to refer to their leaders, and “virtually every religion in the world” is repre-
sented in the United States, terminology native to a single religion, even the 
current majority religion, must not define the legal standard.199  Instead, in-
dividual religious employers must be left to “determine who is qualified to 
serve in positions of substantial religious importance.”200  Justice Alito was 
unconcerned that Perich performed a mixture of secular and religious duties 
for Hosanna-Tabor, concluding that “[w]hat matters is that [Perich] played 
an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious message.”201  Ul-
 
a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities 
a secular court will consider religious.”). 
 195. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196–97.  Tellingly, Justice Thomas avoided the name “ministe-
rial exception,” referring instead to “[a] religious organization’s right to choose its ministers.”  Id. 
 196. Id. at 197–98. 
 197. Id. at 197.   
 198. Id. at 202 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito emphasized that a formal title is “neither nec-
essary nor sufficient,” adding that “no circuit [considering the ministerial exception] has made ordi-
nation status or formal title determinative of the exception’s applicability.”  Id. 
 199. Id. at 198 (“The term ‘minister’ . . . is rarely if ever used [to refer to members of their clergy] 
by Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists.”). 
 200. Id. at 200 (adding that “[d]ifferent religions will have different views on exactly what quali-
fies as an important religious position”). 
 201. Id. at 204.  
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timately, her function as an employee granted Hosanna-Tabor “the right to 
decide for itself whether [she] was religiously qualified to remain in her of-
fice.”202  Similarly, a religious employer’s control over employees who per-
sonify its beliefs “is an essential component of its freedom to speak in its 
own voice, both to its own members and to the outside world.”203 
Justice Alito developed this idea further in Our Lady of Guadalupe, not-
ing that both Catholic elementary schools in the case expressly regarded 
their teachers as “playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the 
church.”204  As its rationale for weighing the schools’ own perceptions in its 
analysis, the Court stated that “the schools’ definition and explanation of 
[teachers’] roles is important.”205  The Court did not entirely relegate author-
ity to employers to determine which of their employees are ministers, but by 
declaring employers’ input “important,” the Court seems to have taken a ju-
dicial baby step in that direction.206  Further steps are likely, because defer-
ence to religious employers to classify their own ministers was strongly 
urged by both of the concurring opinions in Hosanna-Tabor207 as well as the 
concurrence in Our Lady of Guadalupe.208  These three concurring opinions 
were authored or joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch, in-
dicating support from at least four justices for deference to employers in de-
fining minsters.209 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 201. 
 204. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2066 (2020). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 565 
U.S. 171, 196 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the Religion Clauses require civil 
courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith under-
standing of who qualifies as its minister.”); Id. at 206 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Hosanna–Tabor be-
lieves that the religious function that [Perich] performed made it essential that she abide by the doc-
trine of internal dispute resolution; and the civil courts are in no position to second-guess that 
assessment.”). 
 208. See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“To avoid disad-
vantaging . . . minority faiths and interfering in ‘a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and 
mission,’ courts should defer to a religious organization’s sincere determination that a position is 
‘ministerial.’” (internal citation omitted)).  Justice Gorsuch, who was appointed to the Court five 
years after Hosanna-Tabor, joined Justice Thomas’s concurrence.  Id. at 2069. 
 209. In her dissenting opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe, Justice Sotomayor identified the Court’s 
deferential approach when she accused the majority of “collaps[ing] Hosanna-Tabor’s careful analy-
sis into a single consideration: whether a church thinks its employees play an important religious 
role.”  Id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor concluded that employees poten-
tially covered by Our Lady of Guadalupe’s more deferential approach to the ministerial exception 
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The post-Our Lady of Guadalupe addition of Justice Amy Coney Barrett 
to the Court may provide a fifth voice in support of this view.210  In 2018, 
then-Judge Barrett joined a Seventh Circuit panel which concluded that the 
ministerial exception barred an employment discrimination suit from Miriam 
Grussgott, a Hebrew teacher terminated by a Jewish school.211  The panel 
rejected the teacher’s attempt to classify her duties as purely secular, cau-
tioning that “drawing a distinction between secular and religious teaching 
. . . is inappropriate when doing so involves the government challenging a 
religious institution’s honest assertion that a particular practice is a tenet of 
its faith.”212  The panel clarified that deferring to religious employers “does 
not mean that we can never question [their] designation of what constitutes 
religious activity, but we defer to the organization in situations like this one, 
where there is no sign of subterfuge.”213  In her confirmation hearing before 
the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Justice Barrett articulated her 
personal view that “Our Lady of Guadalupe gives a lot of deference to the 
school’s characterization of whether someone is a minister or not, not to en-
courage discrimination of course, but simply to protect religious free-
dom.”214 
Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe serve to both define and 
forecast the Court’s vision for the ministerial exception, and strongly suggest 
judicial priorities in identifying “ministers”—namely, that function trumps 
title, secular duties may predominate over religious duties, an employee 
need not adhere to the faith of its employer, and the employing religious in-
stitution must have the final say in identifying its own ministers.215  Taken 
together with the majority’s “personifying belief” standard for ministers, 
 
would include “nurses, social-service workers . . . and many others who work for religious institu-
tions.”  Id. at 2082. 
 210. See Senate Confirms Amy Coney Barrett For Supreme Court, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 26, 
2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/senate-confirms-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court/. 
 211. Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (2018) (per curiam). 
 212. Id. at 660. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Nomination of the Honorable Amy Coney Barrett to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States (Day 3), COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Oct. 14, 2020) (beginning at 
2:14:45), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/nomination-of-the-honorable-amy-coney-
barrett-to-be-an-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states-day-3. 
 215. See also John H. Garvey, Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 567, 578 (1990) (“The group is a legal and moral person distinct from its 
members; its interests may conflict with theirs.  Its freedom is not a compound of individual liber-
ties[;] . . . it is a right to act in ways peculiar to the group.”) (footnote omitted). 
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these qualities perfectly outline the role healthcare workers play in Catholic 
hospitals.  While doctors and nurses are by no means employed for the pur-
pose of providing religious instruction in a literal sense, they are indispensa-
ble to the core Catholic ministry of healthcare, and functionally perform the 
role of ministers in that context.216  Furthermore, if the discretionary labels 
of the religious institution itself are to guide the process, healthcare workers 
must be classified as ministers if the Catholic Church regards them as 
such.217  Finally, this categorization would affect healthcare workers in only 
a narrow subset of medical situations, given that the secular standard of care 
is acceptable to Catholic healthcare institutions unless a patient requests a 
procedure forbidden by the ERDs.218 
C. Denying Conscience Protections for Healthcare Institutions Is 
“Courting Anarchy” 
Because every state PAD Act is a “neutral law of general applicability,” 
their effect on religious liberty must be discussed in light of the oft-reviled 
Supreme Court ruling in Employment Division v. Smith.219  In Smith, an out-
of-character Justice Scalia interpreted the Free Exercise Clause as allowing 
the government to enact laws restricting the free exercise of religion, provid-
ed that the restriction is a side-effect of the law and not its stated purpose 
and that the law is “neutral” on its face (i.e., it applies equally to non-
 
 216. See Health and Health Care: A Pastoral Letter of the American Catholic Bishops, supra note 
189, at 15–19. 
 217. For an acknowledgment of the inevitable, knee-jerk objection to this deference to religious 
organizations to determine which exemptions their free exercise rights require (namely, that false 
claims and pandemonium will ensue), see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens 
on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) (“Behind every free exercise 
claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted 
with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe.”).  For a sug-
gested answer to this challenge under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) (dis-
cussed infra note 222), see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom 
and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 255 (1995) (“Government does not have a compelling 
interest in avoiding the costs of evaluating the sincerity of claims for religious exemption. . . .  
[RFRA] compels an evaluation of burdens on religious exercise.  It would be nonsensical for Gov-
ernment to then claim a compelling interest in avoidance of the bureaucratic or administrative costs 
of complying with the statute’s accommodation mandate.”). 
 218. See ERDs, supra note 89, at 20–22 (discussing issues in care for the seriously ill and dying). 
 219. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).  For a scathing critique of Smith, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Jus-
tice Scalia’s Worst Opinion, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.thepublicdiscourse. 
com/2015/04/14844/. 
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religious and religious conduct).220  Criticism of this momentous opinion 
erupted immediately and continues to this day,221 but Congress acknowl-
edged the public outcry by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) three years later.222  Although the twenty-first century has witnessed 
a resurgence of judicial support for religious liberty, Smith endures as a 
thorn in the side of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence—except, since Ho-
sanna-Tabor, in the case of the Free Exercise doctrine of the ministerial ex-
ception.223 
Although Smith’s holding appeared to govern the holding of Hosanna-
Tabor, Chief Justice Roberts meticulously distinguished the ostensibly dis-
criminatory statute the Court upheld in Smith (an Oregon law prohibiting 
peyote use that cost two Native American religious peyote-users their jobs) 
from the ostensibly discriminatory statute the Court set aside in Hosanna-
Tabor (the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation).224  With the finesse of a sur-
geon’s scalpel, Chief Justice Roberts dissected the nearly-identical legal 
scenarios to excise the jurisprudential tumor of Smith: where Smith exam-
ined government regulation of “only outward physical acts,” Hosanna-Tabor 
examined “government interference with an internal church decision that af-
fects the faith and mission of the church itself.”225  By predicating the consti-
 
 220. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79, 890. 
 221. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 219. 
 222. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993) [hereinafter RFRA].  For a 
detailed analysis of the contents and impact of RFRA, see Paulsen, supra note 217.  Under RFRA, 
religious laws directly targeting religious exercise must survive strict scrutiny analysis by demon-
strating a compelling state interest.  RFRA.  Though RFRA only applies to the federal government, 
it has been mirrored in twenty-one state RFRAs since 1993.  See State Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Acts, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.  The RFRA standard may very well im-
plicate state PAD laws, because their pointed “not suicide” language and “premises clauses” are, 
arguably, directly targeted against religious anti-PAD beliefs.  See supra Sections III.B.–C.; see also 
Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1191 (asking whether “the Free Exercise Clause [is] about what govern-
ment is aiming at with its laws (the non-discrimination rule reading) or about what it hits (the ef-
fects, or substantive right reading),” and concluding that history and structural interpretation strongly 
support the latter view). 
 223. See Paulsen, supra note 219 (“Smith’s reading of the Free Exercise Clause as a mere nondis-
crimination rule is thus contrary to the best, most natural reading of the text; in tension with its logic 
and purposes; inconsistent with the premises that justify it; and at odds with much evidence of its 
original understanding.  In a word, Smith is simply wrong.”). 
 224. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
565 U.S. 171, 189–90 (2012). 
 225. Id. at 190. 
[Vol. 48: 175, 2021] The Right to Conscience vs. The Right to Die 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
217 
tutionality of Hosanna-Tabor upon internal church decisions, the Court not 
only successfully sidestepped Smith, but it also broadened the ministerial ex-
ception significantly and solidified its constitutional foundation as firmly 
within the purview of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause.226 
Justice Scalia’s stated concern in Smith has been summarized formulai-
cally: “Religious Pluralism plus Religious Liberty equals Anarchy.”227  Any 
society that requires a compelling government interest before permitting a 
restriction on religious liberty is “courting anarchy,” according to Justice 
Scalia, and this courtship grows increasingly dire in proportion to that socie-
ty’s religious diversity.228  As the tragic culmination, he envisioned “a sys-
tem in which each conscience is a law unto itself.”229 
Abstract logic may have supported Justice Scalia’s fears, but the past 
three decades have proven him wrong.  The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act enacted by Congress in response to Smith imposes the exacting “com-
pelling interest” test on the government before permitting any burden (direct 
or indirect) on the free exercise of religion—and our society today, though 
more religiously pluralistic than ever before, remains far from the anarchy 
Justice Scalia fearfully anticipated.230  Ironically, the greatest modern peril 
threatening to unravel our nation’s moral fabric is not the overabundant free-
for-all of claimed religious exemptions Justice Scalia sought to preclude; ra-
ther, it is arguably the precise opposite: the inability of conscientious reli-
gious institutions to claim the exemptions necessary to preserve a moral fab-
ric that is unravelling all on its own. 
As modern medicine continues to exponentially advance in scope and 
power, old questions continue to receive new answers: What is the role of 
biology in gender, and of gender in society?231  What is the proper standard 
 
 226. Id. at 195–96.  The majority opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe does not mention Smith.  140 
S. Ct. 2409 (2020). 
 227. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the 
General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 853 (2001). 
 228. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
 229. Id. at 890. 
 230. RFRA § 2000bb–1(b), supra note 222.  In 1997, the Supreme Court held that RFRA only 
applies to the federal government, propelling a wave of state RFRAs that essentially mirror the fed-
eral RFRA model.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); see also State Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 222 (outlining how twenty-one states have implemented state 
RFRAs). 
 231. See, e.g., Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Boys and Men, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL 
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for “healthy” sexuality?232  What, if any, are the moral implications of genet-
ically modifying human beings?233  Perhaps the two most important ques-
tions in contemporary medical ethics deal with the extent and value of hu-
man existence: When does life begin?  When does life end?234  When the 
questions are life-or-death in consequence and metaphysical in scope, the 
authority we trust to answer them is colossally important.235  The modern 
American legal system has refused to designate such an authority, instead 
delegating these fundamental moral questions to individual healthcare work-
ers nationwide, who often possess little or no philosophical, ethical, or spir-
itual training.236  In a dramatic reversal of Justice Scalia’s bleak vision in 
 
ASS’N 1, 2 (Aug. 2018), https://www.apa.org/about/policy/boys-men-practice-guidelines.pdf (“Gen-
der refers to psychological, social, and cultural experiences and characteristics associated with the 
social statuses of girls and women or boys and men . . . includ[ing] assumptions, social beliefs, 
norms, and stereotypes about the behavior, cognitions, and emotions of males and females.”); see 
also GOODRICH, supra note 146, at 107–44; GEORGE, supra note 15, at 167–75. 
 232. See, e.g., FAQ on Health and Sexual Diversity—An Introduction to Key Concepts, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 1, 1–2 (2016), https://www.who.int/gender-equity-rights/news/20170329-health-and-
sexual-diversity-faq.pdf (“Sexuality . . . encompasses sex, gender identities and roles, sexual orienta-
tion, eroticism, pleasure, intimacy and reproduction.  Sexuality is influenced by the intersection of 
biological, psychological, social, economic, political, cultural, legal, historical, religious, and spiritu-
al factors.”). 
 233. See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Genetically Modified Babies Are Ethically OK, REASON (Nov. 26, 
2019, 10:15 AM), https://reason.com/2019/11/26/genetically-modified-babies-are-ethically-ok/; As-
soc. Press, Chinese Researcher Claims Birth of First Gene-Edited Babies—Twin Girls, STAT (Nov. 
25, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/11/25/china-first-gene-edited-babies-born/. 
 234. See George, supra note 37, at 419–20.  Professor George captures the vast scope of modern 
conceptions of the value of human life: 
[S]ome people argue that there are human beings who are not yet persons—namely, those 
in the embryonic, fetal, and at least early infant stages of development—and other human 
beings who will never become, or are no longer, persons—the severely retarded, the seri-
ously demented, those in permanent comas or persistent vegetative states.  For people 
who hold this view, the question is not when does the life of a human being begin or end, 
but when does a human being qualify as a person, and therefore a creature with a serious 
right to life. 
Id.; see also GEORGE, supra note 15, at 195 (“A common error is for people to convert the question 
of when a human life begins from a matter of biology to a matter of religious faith or personal be-
lief.”). 
 235. See GORSUCH, supra note 55, at 160–61 (“[I]f one’s valuable humanness (and thus legal in-
violability) turns on one’s currently exercisable abilities for self-creation and self-expression, what 
specific traits and qualities must one exhibit?  And how developed must they be before one qualifies 
for equal protection under the law?”). 
 236. For a brief glimpse at the throng of inconsistent moral conclusions asserted by various physi-
cians and bioethicists, see, e.g., Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 93, at 2566 (arguing against con-
science claims because they “obstruct[] access to goods and services”); Consensus Statement on 
Conscientious Objection in Healthcare, PRACTICAL ETHICS (Aug. 29, 2016), http://blog. 
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Smith, we are now “courting anarchy” by refusing to afford religious 
healthcare institutions the conscience protections they require to fulfill their 
medical ministry according to their sincerely held religious beliefs.237  Inad-
vertently, we have created the secular analogue of Justice Scalia’s morally 
lawless nightmare: “a system in which each conscience is a law unto it-
self.”238 
V. CONCLUSION 
The right to follow one’s own conscience is foundational to the religious 
freedoms enshrined in the First Amendment, and this right is especially crit-
ical in the field of healthcare because any work involving the value of life 
inherently involves moral, conscientious, and even spiritual dimensions.239  
As the power and scope of the medical profession continue to expand in con-
junction with the relentless advance of modern technology, the moral and 
ethical views espoused by healthcare workers and institutions will play an 
increasingly influential role in our society.240  Now—before new and unfore-
seen technologies compound the ethical dilemmas—is the time for our coun-
try to decide its priorities when it comes to the competing claims of medical 
and religious autonomy.241 
The PAD legalization movement in the medical field is accelerating: 
nine jurisdictions have already embraced PAD, and its popularity continues 
to grow among Americans.242  The tireless pro-PAD groups driving this 
movement are expanding in influence and funding, and their increasingly 
tense, even antagonistic, relationship with conscientious anti-PAD groups 
(most notably, the Catholic Church) shows no signs of relenting, conceding, 
 
practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2016/08/consensus-statement-on-conscientious-objection-in-healthcare/ (ar-
guing that healthcare workers claiming conscience exemptions “should be required to compensate 
society and the health system for their failure to fulfil their professional obligations”); Martha S. 
Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal Beliefs Versus Professional 
Responsibilities, 6 YALE. J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS, 269, 278 (2006) (arguing that “health care 
professionals should be admonished that conscientious objections based on personal beliefs, as op-
posed to professional ethics, will entail consequences”). 
 237. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
 238. Id. at 890.  
 239. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
 240. See supra Section IV.C. 
 241. See GEORGE, supra note 15, at 97–110. 
 242. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
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or seeking common ground.243  The new PAD Acts sweeping the nation do 
not incidentally impact the field of conscience—the tactical vocabulary and 
“premises clauses” embedded in every single state PAD Act betray an un-
derlying intent to undercut all conscientious opposition from the outset.244 
Fortunately, the solution presents itself in the powerful fortification of 
religious liberty represented in the 2012 Hosanna-Tabor decision, and ex-
pounded in the 2020 Our Lady of Guadalupe decision, in the form of the 
ministerial exception.245  Religious liberty jurisprudence has long recognized 
the necessity, under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, of allow-
ing religious institutions to hire and fire their own “ministers,” because these 
unique employees teach, represent, and even personify the religious mission 
of the institution.246  Importantly, the Court took the critical step of recogniz-
ing that certain employees of religious institutions “personify [the] be-
liefs”247 of the institution even when they lack the formal title, training, or 
overtly ministerial role that the misleading phrase “ministerial exception” 
implies.248 
In light of its centuries-old and world-renowned commitment to healing 
the sick, the Catholic Church’s healthcare employees necessarily personify 
its beliefs and, in the language of Chief Justice Roberts, “carry out [its] mis-
sion.”249  These medical ministers are functional, if not literal, representa-
tives of Catholic doctrine, and the Church must therefore be permitted to 
manage them according to Hosanna-Tabor’s understanding of the ministeri-
al exception.250  For the government to intervene and second-guess the 
Church’s identification of its own ministers would be an unconstitutional vi-
olation of the Church’s religious autonomy to select its leaders and define its 
own beliefs and practices. 
Ironically, the ethical free-for-all Justice Scalia feared in Employment 
Division v. Smith is taking place in the secular, rather than the religious, 
sphere.  We have avoided trusting any single religious institution with the 
 
 243. See supra Section III.A. 
 244. See supra Sections III.B. and III.C. 
 245. See supra Section IV.A. 
 246. See supra Section IV.A. 
 247. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012); see supra Section IV.A. 
 248. See supra Section IV.A. 
 249. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196; see supra Section IV.B.1. 
 250. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
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task of conscientiously weighing our proposed medical developments; in-
stead, we have delegated this immensely important responsibility to thou-
sands of individual doctors across the nation.  The inevitable result is that 
each individual healthcare worker has become a “law unto himself.”251 
As the tension continues to escalate between conscientious religious 
healthcare organizations and pro-PAD advocacy groups, the ministerial ex-
ception is the best option for protecting institutional free exercise of reli-
gion.252  In the coming decades, as this tension continues to manifest in the 
courts, the right to conscience in the field of healthcare must supersede any 
competing claims. 
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